Untangling the Finance Goal

NCQG process elements
Elements	Scope
Ad hoc work program	TEDs led by 2 cochairs (developed/developing countries), 4 TEDs/year, and organized based on Party and non-Party submissions Annual reports developed by cochairs to report key findings and a summary of work program; annual reports will inform deliberations at the high-level ministerial dialogues Regular consultations with Parties and non-Parties to inform the ad hoc work program
Submissions	Regular call for submissions from Parties and non-Party stakeholders Technical paper on the submissions and developed by the secretariat
High-level ministerial dialogue	Summary led by the CMA president for consideration of the CMA
Stocktakes and guidance from CMA	Led by CMA in 2022 and 2023, considering outcomes of all elements; adopt the NCQG by 2024

This section provides an overview of some of the key elements discussed and addressed by Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including the quantitative amount, thematic scope, time frame of the goal, contributor base, and transparency arrangements. This list of elements is not intended to be exhaustive but rather to highlight the recurrent topics raised through NCQG-related discussions and to contribute to conversations about setting a goal by 2025.

What should the quantity of the NCQG be, and what role should the quality of finance play?

What is discussed?

Counting the provision versus mobilization of climate finance

When discussing the quantum of the NCQG, different elements addressed in this paper are also key to untangling the available options to establish a quantity. First, it is necessary to address two terms used in both the Convention and the Paris Agreement as well as in decisions related to climate finance: provision and mobilization. These terms date from the adoption of the Convention (Articles 4.3 and 4.4). Provision of finance refers to funding provided directly by developed country governments, whereas mobilization of finance refers to investments that are crowded in from other sources, instruments, and channels, including private finance or other innovative sources. With the adoption of the $100 billion goal, developed countries once again committed to provide and mobilize resources to meet the goal.

Parties are debating the potential role and scope of the provision versus mobilization of finance, as well as who should be responsible for each. Developed countries have, for example, suggested that Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which states that developed countries should have leadership in mobilizing resources, should be read in conjunction with Article 2.1c, which states that Parties should make “finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (UNFCCC 2016). In this context, these Parties suggest that the NCQG should focus on mobilizing resources by all countries, as a global effort (a notion reflected in Article 9.3); they propose that resources come from various sources—public, private, domestic, international—and consider the solidarity, responsibility, and ability of actors to contribute according to the principles of CBDR-RC (European Union 2023a). Regarding provision, some developed countries have reaffirmed their commitment to provide financial resources to developing countries, especially the most vulnerable. Further, some countries have stated that the contributor base should be expanded (European Union 2023b), for example, based on the economic capacity of other countries to increase the quantity of climate finance provided, particularly high-income economies, excluding those that are highly vulnerable to climate change (Government of Canada 2023) (see “Contributor: Who should contribute to the NCQG?” for more in-depth discussion).

For their part, developing countries have expressed interest in ensuring that the NCQG focuses primarily on the provision of climate finance from developed to developing countries. Based on Article 9, developed countries would be obligated to provide financial flows and to lead the mobilization, and other Parties’ contributions would be based on solidarity and not be perceived as an obligation to increase the provision. Developing countries have mentioned that incorporating Article 2.1c into the goal potentially conditions aid from developed countries unjustly on the alignment of financial flows in their countries. Further, discussions about the incorporation of Article 2.1c need to consider its implementation in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty and in line with the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, in light of different national circumstances as expressed in Article 2.

These interpretations of Articles 2.1c and 9 lead to alternative scenarios for defining the quantum. The new goal could be structured as a quantitative goal with only the provision of finance by developed countries, one goal for the provision of finance by developed countries and one for mobilization by these same countries, one for developed country provision and mobilization together, and a goal for developed country provision and a goal for mobilization from all parties (that includes qualitative aspects such as policy and regulatory frameworks that mainstream climate as a variable to align climate finance through different policies, such as green procurement and climate-related bonds, among others).

Quantum and the needs and priorities of developing countries

The NCQG will have to be determined “taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries” (UNFCCC 2016). In recent years, various research organizations and private firms have developed both bottom-up and top-down approaches, focusing on adaptation, mitigation, or loss and damage (L&D) and, in some cases, breaking down needs at a sectoral level and by geography. How these approaches may impact the new goal’s quantity remains uncertain.

Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are one key source of information when determining global climate finance needs. As of August 31, 2023, 91 developing countries had provided estimates of financial need in their NDCs (with cutoff dates between 2025 and 2040) totaling $4.5 trillion. Of this total, $1.6 trillion is conditional on receipt of international support, and $0.6 trillion is unconditional. (The total amounts of conditional and unconditional finance requirements do not equal the total amount of $4.5 trillion because not all countries have disaggregated between their conditional and unconditional finance requirements in their NDCs.)

Studies use different approaches and cover different geographic or sectoral scopes. Several studies use a top-down approach, where estimations use methodologies that link global warming estimates to changes in economic growth and associated damages. Other studies use bottom-up approaches, using estimates directly produced by countries (for example, in their NDCs or national adaptation plans). Where information is not available for a country, studies have extrapolated potential costs. For either approach—top down or bottom up—studies are using different models and methodologies to assess global climate-related investment needs. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are increasingly used by national governments and in international assessments (Nordhaus 2017). IAMs aim to calculate the impacts of alternative assumptions (e.g., climate policies) on variables such as investments, output, or emissions.

Mitigation finance assessments

As shown in Figure 1, estimates of required global annual spending on mitigation to achieve net zero by 2050 range from $3.5 trillion to $9.2 trillion per year and from $105 trillion to $275 trillion in total by 2050. In these reports, most investments focus on the transition to zero-emission energy sources. Some of these reports also show disaggregated sources of finance (private versus public).

On the higher end, a report by McKinsey & Company provided an estimate covering the energy and land-use sectors based on a relatively comprehensive approach to household and business spending on assets that use energy. For example, it includes the full cost of passenger cars and heat pumps, capital expenditures in agriculture and forestry, and continued spending on high-emitting physical assets such as fossil fuel–based vehicles and power assets. This report found that $9.2 trillion per year, or a total $275 trillion by 2050, would be required for the world to achieve a net zero transition by 2050 (McKinsey & Company 2022).

A report by Vivid Economics (2021), focusing primarily on the energy sector, found that global investments to achieve net zero by 2050 would amount to $4.5 trillion per year or a total of $125 trillion by 2050. Similarly, the Energy Transition Committee and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) have produced their own estimates of global energy sector investments required to achieve net zero by 2050. The Energy Transition Committee estimates that $3.5 trillion per year, or a total of $105 trillion by 2050, will be required (ETC 2023). IRENA, however, provides an estimate of $5.4 trillion per year and a total of $115 trillion (IRENA 2023). IRENA’s report shows a more dramatic role for the private sector, with $56 trillion in private funding needed by 2030 versus $1 trillion in public funding (IRENA 2023).

Adaptation finance assessments

In the case of adaptation, most reports base their estimates on a combination of national cost estimates and global top-down cost estimates, and they assume time frames related to expenditures required to achieve net zero by 2050. Some of these reports disaggregate their estimates between developed and developing countries. Reports have found that expenditures required for adaptation can range from $0.05 trillion to $1.1 trillion per year by 2050 globally and from $0.1 trillion to $0.9 trillion per year by 2050 for developing countries, as shown in Figure 2. These reports have relied on different methodologies, including the Adaptation Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy (AD-RICE) (Baarsch et al. 2015), extrapolation (UNEP 2022), and bottom-up estimates (Chapagain et al 2020).

Loss and Damage finance assessments

Related to L&D, costs range from $1.1 trillion to $2.7 trillion per year on average by 2050 under the net zero scenario, as shown in Figure 3. Markandya and González-Eguino (2019) found that global L&D ranged from $1.8 trillion to $2.7 trillion per year by 2050. This report is based on an IAM that applies different discount rates to find low and high damages at a global level. The report uses 2005$ values and focuses only on economic losses. Those costs not covered by adaptation measures are classified as L&D costs (Markandya and González-Eguino 2019).

A subsequent report produced by Heinrich Boll was based on major extreme climate and weather events and the model from Markandya and González-Eguino (2019), updating this from 2005$ values to 2023$ values and removing developed countries (Richards et al. 2023). The latter methodology is used in Figure 3 for comparison purposes. A separate report from Climate Analytics estimated L&D costs based on an IAM model, specifically an AD-RICE model, finding that costs ranged from $1.07 trillion to $1.85 trillion per year by 2050. This report estimated macroeconomic damages in 2012$, and the other two reports estimated residual damages (L&D minus adaptation costs) (Baarsch et al. 2015).

Setting a numerical figure will not be sufficient; what’s the role of quality?

Parties have also discussed a need to consider other aspects of the finance being provided, such as whether it is in the form of grants or loans. These concepts are usually described as the “quality” of climate finance. Questions remain about the degree to which they will factor into the final quantum of the goal. Nevertheless, Parties are considering different components, including the concessionality, effectiveness, accessibility, and predictability of climate finance (Table 2) (see Cozzi et al. [2022] and Argueta et al. [2022] for a more detailed description of quality aspects).

Table 2 | Key elements under consideration regarding the quantity of finance

Key elements under consideration regarding the quantity of finance
Feature	Scope	Related elements of the NCQG to mainstream the quality feature
Concessional	Level of concessionality of financial instruments through which flows are provided in a way that does not increase levels of indebtedness	Identify and assess the potential of the current and innovative financial instruments
Effective	Measurement of the impact of climate finance to achieve the desired outcomes	Transparency framework that monitors progress toward quality achievement based on climate finance impact and outcomes
Accessible	Refers to the process to access climate finance and how it may sometimes become a barrier to access financial flows	Channels through which the flows will be provided, financial instruments (e.g., a minimum share or value for grants)
Predictable	Certainty of who, how, when flows will be available	Quantity, contributor base, thematic scope, and their potential subtargets

Note: NCQG = new collective quantified goal.

Source: WRI authors, based on Argueta et al. (2021, 2022) and Cozzi et al. (2022).

Certain qualitative components, including accessibility and concessionality, touch upon whether the goal should incorporate language on the types of financial instruments involved. Developing country Parties, in particular, have expressed interest in increasing grant financing or other forms of finance that do not increase the debt burden of countries. They propose this in response to the high levels of debt held by many countries today: 53 percent of low-income countries—23 of which are among the 50 most climate-vulnerable nations globally—are now at increased risk of difficulties in repaying their debts (Alayza et al 2023). In addition to traditional forms of climate finance, Parties have had some early discussion on whether other forms of innovative financial instruments, particularly those instruments that have the potential to increase countries’ fiscal space, can be considered. For example, the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (Asociación Independiente de Latinoamérica y el Caribe; AILAC) and Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (ABU) mentioned in their respective submissions that the new goal should foster the use of innovative instruments such as debt swaps, payment for environmental services, and blended finance (ABU 2022; AILAC 2022).

Regarding access to climate finance, the Paris Agreement emphasizes that the “institutions serving the Agreement, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval procedures and enhanced readiness support for developing country Parties” (UNFCCC 2016). However, developing countries have been struggling to effectively access climate flows (Argueta et al. 2021). Many developing countries have flagged the difficulties they have faced in accessing funding from the climate funds and similar sources in a timely manner. This includes difficulties with meeting, for example, data or cofinancing requirements. They call for more flexibility and quicker, more simplified processes. They also call for continued emphasis on channeling funding through local agencies. Developed countries, meanwhile, tend to recognize the need for ease of access but also emphasize the need for standards and procedures to ensure that funds are used appropriately.

What’s at stake?

Determining the quantum of the new goal is arguably the most crucial aspect of these negotiations. Parties need to decide on whether they are selecting one or multiple goals. This is a fundamental factor that influences all other parts of the negotiations. It touches upon the basic relationship between developed and developing countries as well as their roles in relation to implementation of the Paris Agreement.

“Taking into account” the needs and priorities of developing countries is also an important point of negotiation. First, Parties will need to determine how to assess these needs. Should Parties rely on Parties’ own assessments in their NDCs or on external assessments? Second, Parties will need to decide on how these estimates will impact the final quantum. What role do needs assessments play in determining a quantitative goal?

Parties have also discussed the need to consider the quality of the finance being provided. For example, developing countries highlight the need to balance thematic areas, ensure predictability, strengthen access, and increase concessionality of the funding provided. Developed countries, meanwhile, want to ensure that funds are used effectively. Questions remain about the degree to which they will factor into the final quantum of the goal.

Theme: What should the goal fund?

What is discussed?

What’s the role of L&D within the thematic scope?

The decisions and commitments leading to the $100 billion goal exclusively referred to support for climate action in developing countries, where funding to date has been allocated mainly to mitigation and (to a lesser degree) adaptation actions, likely due to the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency of implementation in developing countries. Thus, progress on the goal has been measured under these two categories. However, developing countries have questioned whether the NCQG can include L&D as finance category.

Decisions adopted within the UNFCCC and reports have reinforced the role that L&D finance might play in the NCQG. At COP19 (2013) in Poland, climate negotiators established the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. Two years later, in Paris, an L&D article was embedded in the Paris Agreement calling for Parties to avert, minimize, and address L&D. The first L&D finance-related reports under the Convention were developed in 2019, when COP22 recommended the UNFCCC Secretariat prepare a paper identifying the sources of financial support for addressing L&D. At COP25, the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage was established. However, developing countries and civil society organizations insisted on the need for a fund to respond to L&D, and the sixth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also clearly highlighted L&D due to climate impacts (IPCC 2021).

These actions paved the way for L&D finance to be formally included as part of the UN climate change negotiations at COP27. This led to the opportunity to officially address “funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage” (UNFCCC 2022a). As an outcome of these discussions at COP27, Parties decided to establish new funding arrangements for assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and to establish a fund to respond to L&D whose mandate includes a focus on addressing L&D (UNFCCC 2022a).

The operationalization of the funding arrangements and the newly created L&D fund will be informed by recommendations provided by a transitional committee. The committee will recommend the institutional arrangements, modalities, structure, governance, and terms of reference for the fund. It also will define the elements of the new funding arrangements, identifying and expanding sources of funding and ensuring coordination and complementarity with existing funding arrangements.

As stated by the IPCC, scientific evidence already confirms that countries, mainly the most vulnerable developing countries, are experiencing the economic and noneconomic impacts of L&D. Economic impacts include both sudden-onset events (e.g., floods, storms, and cyclones) and slower-onset processes (e.g., droughts, sea level rise, desertification, and glacial retreat) as well as noneconomic impacts that include loss of heritage and biodiversity. Some reports have estimated finance needs for L&D by 2050 to be up to $1,745 billion and $2,684 billion per year (Richards et al. 2023). For example, Pakistan’s L&D costs alone, caused by the recent flooding disasters in 2022, were estimated at $40 billion. These costs do not consider noneconomic L&D.

Developing countries and country groups, including ABU, the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN), AILAC, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group have expressed the view that L&D should be included in the NCQG (ABU 2022; AGN 2022; AILAC 2023; AOSIS 2022; LDC Group 2023). They point to, among other provisions, Article 3 of the Paris Agreement, which states that “the efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement” (UNFCCC 2016). Further, they point out that the Paris Agreement includes L&D in Article 8, in which parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing, and addressing L&D associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

Dividing the pie between adaptation, mitigation, and L&D

Parties are also discussing whether to have specific subtargets for the different types of finance: adaptation, mitigation, and (potentially) L&D. Under the Paris Agreement, Parties agreed to ensure a “balance” between adaptation and mitigation finance. However, the definition of balance was not made clear, and adaptation finance has typically lagged behind financing for mitigation, even before the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

In considering the role of mitigation, adaptation, and L&D finance, negotiators are looking at whether to create specific targets for each type of finance. This requires agreement on how to determine the correct division between these themes and how to facilitate successful monitoring of these finance targets. For example, this may involve considering how to compare different types of finance, such as grants versus debt financing (Watson 2023).

What’s at stake?

COP27 changed the climate finance landscape with a decision on L&D finance. Developing countries’ climate finance needs have included some measurement of L&D, but the negotiation outcome at COP 27 in Egypt has paved the way for due recognition. Because the NCQG has a mandate to consider developing countries’ needs, now the main question revolves around how the new goal should treat L&D finance and its role in the balance equation.

In addition, there is a question of whether—and, if so, how—to set specific targets or goals for each of the types of finance. Some parties have made clear their view that the addition of L&D to the balance of adaptation and mitigation should neither lower nor limit the amount of finance provided for mitigation or adaptation initiatives. If an L&D subtarget is to be included, negotiators will need to incorporate considerations around the size of the target and how to measure such finance. Parties will also need to consider the relationship of the new goal with the establishment and operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including the L&D fund, mainly if funds directed to the L&D fund can be counted toward the NCQG.

Time frame: What time frame should the goal cover?

What is discussed?

Parties need to determine a time frame for the NCQG and potential intermediate milestones or review cycles upon which the goal may be updated over time. As was evidenced during the fifth TED (UNFCCC 2023), Parties generally identify the time frame options around long-term perspectives, looking at 2050 as a specific target; medium-term time frames, covering 10-year review cycles; and short-term, or 5-year, implementation periods.

Shorter time frames have been proposed to account for changing administrations, election cycles, political challenges, and the potential to coincide with NDC and Global Stocktake (GST) update and submission processes. Proposers of shorter time frames have also argued that these would allow a higher level of predictability for developing countries and that an ambitious short-term goal could consequently incentivize ambitious and front-loaded short-term climate action. Those in favor of longer-term time frames have suggested setting a goal for 2050, aligning efforts to most 2050 net zero targets, and signaling commitments to introduce structural changes to the financial systems (UNFCCC 2023).

An adjustable goal?

Developing countries have suggested that the goal be updated based on future needs and scientific findings. The evolving nature of inflation rates, budget cycles, and other external factors may impact the availability and need for resources. Parties, including developed and developing countries, have expressed their interest in being able to adjust the goal to reflect the evolving nature of the global economic landscape. The review process could be developed every two and/or five years to align with the time frame of other UNFCCC processes and reports, such as NDCs, the GST, or biennial transparency reports (BTR). Review milestones could incorporate updated information from national investment plans, new national policies, government terms, and national budget cycles to inform the country’s needs and the quality of climate finance and assess how resources are being used.

Some parties have suggested that a review process could benefit from having an independent expert committee to assess progress and produce a synthesis of annual or biennial reports to inform progress on the goal. In addition, a review process could be further leveraged to assess if climate finance is indeed producing the desired outcomes, a notion supported by developed countries (see Watson 2023). This way, countries—both contributors and recipients—can evaluate the impact of climate finance on specific national goals or priorities.

Some Parties have also raised the question of whether the goal will be maintained on annual terms, as with the $100 billion goal, or if a cumulative goal should also be established. This would allow some of the challenges associated with the $100 billion goal (mainly, not reaching the goal in certain years) to be addressed up front by clearly defining responsibilities for what happens when an annual goal is not met. In this context, some developing country Parties have suggested that an annual goal is more conducive to the transparency framework than a goal with a longer reporting period because the shorter time frame may make it easier to monitor and assess data.

Lastly, Parties are discussing whether to have a centralized system in place to track needs and contributions toward the new goal. It is suggested that a tracking system could support monitoring data from contributors and recipients and be informed by reviews and reports within (e.g., BTRs) and outside (OECD climate finance reports and Oxfam climate finance shadow reports) the UNFCCC.

What’s at stake?

In general, the main challenges to consider concerning the time frame and temporal scope are related to the political will of countries to deliver their promises within the adopted time frame, the availability of updated data to assess compliance with the new goal, the dynamic nature of developing country needs, and the need for accountability mechanisms to track the goal (see “Transparency arrangements: What type of transparency arrangements should accompany the goal?”).

The time frame discussion will have a direct relationship with the negotiated quantum. It has been suggested that a longer time frame could undermine short-term ambitions by allowing the provision of finance to instead increase over time. If they go the route of implementing intermediate review milestones, negotiators will need to consider adequate mechanisms for addressing the uncertainty that such an approach might introduce if it reopens negotiations at each milestone.

Contributor: Who should contribute to the NCQG?

What is discussed?

Interpretations differ about who should provide and mobilize financial flows to meet the NCQG. Some Parties are asking whether the NCQG contributor base should be expanded to include countries beyond those developed countries initially responsible to fulfill the $100 billion goal. The fifth TED acknowledged that subsequent discussions are needed to further understand “how to reflect the provision of ‘collective’ in the implementation, where some argue it could reflect agreeing on burden-sharing arrangements among provider countries, while others referred to broadening the contributor base of provider countries” (UNFCCC 2023).

How was the original list of developed countries determined?

The Convention identifies three main groups of countries according to their commitments. Annex I includes countries that were members of the OECD in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic states, and several Central and Eastern European states. Annex II includes all countries from Annex I, excluding economies in transition. Non–Annex I countries are mainly developing countries that constitute recipients of financial flows.

Article 4.3. of the Convention states that “developed country Parties shall also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by paragraph 1” (UNFCCC 2009). Further, Article 4.4. states that “developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects” (UNFCCC 2009). Article 4.7 mentions that “the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties” (UNFCCC 2009). In this sense, the concept of “developed countries” was deemed as being synonymous with Annex II countries. This is the same definition that other institutions, such as ODI, have generally used, as opposed to the OECD, which includes other EU Member States not included in Annex II (Bos and Thwaites 2021).

What does the Paris Agreement say in terms of who should be contributing to the new goal? The decision adopted at COP21 states that “in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3, developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries” (UNFCCC 2016). (For further understanding of Article 9.3, please see Figure 4.)

Many developing countries emphasize that there should not be a change in the contributor base. For example, the Like-Minded Developing Countries Group submission states, “The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance does not have the mandate to discuss contributors to the goal as it has never been cited in a previous decision. The discussion on contributors is therefore not substantiated in the NCQG process and the options discussed therein will not be useful to the CMA as it does not have a mandate to respond to such options. The exploration of contributors will not yield any productive outcome and the options produced cannot be decided upon within the NCQG agenda item this upcoming CMA in any case” (LMDC 2023). The submission from the Arab Group similarly states that “the matter of contributors to the NCQG has already been agreed by Parties within Article 9 upon the adoption of the agreement. . . . The [NCQG] does not have the mandate to discuss contributors to the goal as it has never been cited in a previous decision” (AG 2023). Other countries have stated that the NCQG is a continuation of the $100 billion goal and, therefore, developed countries remain responsible for following the same responsibilities as that goal (AGN 2023). Further, the new goal is a “means to implement the goal of the Paris Agreement in the context of Article 9, which underlines that developed countries should provide financial resources to support developing countries (Article 9.1) and should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries (Article 9.3); to provide a balance between adaptation and mitigation considering developing countries’ strategies, as well as their priorities and needs (Article 9.4)” (AILAC 2023).

Fundamentally, this position centers on the continuation of finance obligations within Articles 4.3 and 4.4 and on the CBDR-RC principle, where developed countries are considered responsible for the highest levels of historical emissions and their levels of wealth sufficient to provide support to other countries.

However, some developed country Parties argue that the list of countries required to contribute financially to the NCQG should be expanded beyond Annex II (those responsible for the $100 billion goal). For example, some propose including high-emitting countries and those with high economic capacities, including some countries that, under the Paris Agreement, define themselves as developing country Parties (Government of Norway 2023) whereas others suggest focusing on all high-income economies, excluding highly vulnerable countries like Small Island Developing States (Government of Canada 2023). This position commonly points to the evolving international economic landscape, including the larger financial capacity reached by some emerging economies since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 and their levels of GHG emissions in recent decades, either cumulative or per capita. For example, looking at carbon dioxide (CO₂) cumulative emissions between 1990 and 2019, 10 non–Annex II countries are currently among the top 20 high emitters. Of these 10 countries, 2 (South Korea and Saudi Arabia) are considered “high-income” economies according to the World Bank classification, which is based on the per capita gross national income (GNI) (see Figure 5 and Appendix A). Similarly, looking at average per capita emissions from 1990 to 2019, 8 of the top 10 non–Annex II highest per capita emitters are classified as “high-income” economies (see Figure 6 and Appendix B).

Submissions by developed country Parties are increasingly highlighting the relationship between Article 9 and Article 2.1c in the context of establishing the new goal and broadening the contributor base. Article 2.1c, aiming to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, lays out the finance- related long-term goal of the Paris Agreement, which calls for “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (UNFCCC 2016). How this long-term goal will be operationalized is still under discussion.

Some developed countries have pushed for interpreting Article 2.1c as putting responsibility on all Parties to pay for climate action. A submission from Japan suggests discussing “broadening the contributor base through the implementation of Article 2.1c” (Government of Japan 2023). Also, countries such as Norway and New Zealand raise the contributor issue in the context of Article 9 and Article 2.1c (Government of Norway 2023; Government of New Zealand 2023), and the Environmental Integrity Group states that “as part of a global effort, the contributor base should be as broad as possible” (EIG 2022). Developing countries have raised the concern that linking the NCQG discussions to Article 2.1c may distract developed countries from their responsibility to provide and mobilize climate finance. They worry that it will shift responsibility to developing countries’ domestic policies and finance flow shifts or add further conditionalities to the climate finance provided. This was one of the main reasons why the request by some developed countries to include an agenda item to further discuss scope and implementation of Article 2.1c failed at COP27. Instead, the CMA decided to launch the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1c and its complementarity with Article 9, the outcomes of which will be reported to the CMA at COP28.

What’s at stake?

Prior to COP29 (2024), the final text of the NCQG needs to be adopted and any concerns related to the contributor base need to be addressed. As explained above, some Parties feel this warrants an expansion of the list of countries responsible for contributing finance. Others feel there is no legal basis for discussing and implementing such an expansion. They have raised the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, as well as finance responsibilities within the Convention and its relationship with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, to explain that the responsibility should remain in developed countries.

Discussions around expanding or modifying the contributor base will need to be holistic and include factors beyond economic capacities, including, but not limited to, emissions levels, climate vulnerability, and development indicators (see Appendices A and B for a comparison of emissions, GNI, and the Human Development Index, based on life expectancy and education indexes in addition to GNI).

Transparency arrangements: What type of transparency arrangements should accompany the goal?

What is discussed?

How does reporting work today?

Until this point, there have been different reports within the UNFCCC to help track and monitor climate finance flows mobilized by developed countries. Existing UNFCCC reports include BRs and the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows (BA). BRs are submitted by each developed country every two years and include, among other things, reporting on climate finance provided through bilateral and multilateral channels, using a common tabular format (CTF). The BA is issued by the SCF and provides a global overview of climate finance flows and measurement, reporting, and verification support provided to developing countries as well as a compilation of finance data from developed countries’ BRs.

In the case of accountability toward the $100 billion goal, at COP26 the SCF was tasked with developing a report on the progress toward achieving the goal. The resulting report assessed progress on the $100 billion goal based on official reports produced by the UNFCCC (BRs and BA) and the assessments and tracking performed by international organizations and civil society groups such as the OECD and Oxfam (see Figure 7).

Today, some of the existing UNFCCC transparency arrangements are being streamlined under the Paris Agreement to produce annual, biennial, and quadrennial reports to help assess progress under the NCQG.

There are three accountability mechanisms under the Paris Agreement at the individual and aggregate levels (UNFCCC 2022b). Accountability at the individual level is based on the enhanced transparency framework (ETF). Through the ETF, countries report their climate action efforts, including tracking of their NDC and information about the support provided and received by individual relevant Parties toward climate action. Reporting under the ETF is complemented by a review process conducted by third parties to assess and monitor the progress to achieve the Paris Agreement goals (see Table 3).

The information gathered under the ETF will inform the GST. The ETF includes BTRs (starting in 2024, after BRs are replaced) and biennial technical expert reviews. The ETF will promote accountability at the country level by encouraging countries to report on their climate action efforts, including on support provided and received by Parties toward climate action. Reporting under the ETF is complemented by a review process conducted by technical experts, which will determine if BTRs are in accordance with modalities, procedures, and guidelines. The information assessed by the technical expert review includes support provided to developing countries (see Table 3).

Every five years the GST assesses, at an aggregate level, the collective progress toward achieving the Paris Agreement purpose and long-term goals. The GST covers the thematic areas of mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation and support, and it considers information reported and reviewed under the ETF.

Parties have proposed a transparency framework for the NCQG that allows for monitoring and tracking of progress and builds upon existing mechanisms and systems. Several countries have supported the idea of using existing transparency frameworks under the Paris Agreement (see Table 3). For example, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have stated that the “NCQG needs to be based on a solid and transparent reporting system, based on the ETF, that allows for annual assessments of its fulfillment and for recommendations on periodic adjustments to guarantee it will be fully accomplished in its agreed timeframe” (ABU 2022). The United States also supports building the NCQG transparency framework upon existing mechanisms to avoid duplication (U.S. Government 2022). AOSIS mentioned that the transparency and accountability arrangements should be in accordance with the ETF’s modalities, procedures, and guidelines (AOSIS 2022). Several countries and groups of countries, including ABU, AILAC, and AOSIS, have stated that progress on delivering the new goal should be assessed as part of each GST (ABU 2022; AILAC 2022; AOSIS 2022).

In addition, it might be more efficient to task a centralized body, such as the SCF, with producing regular progress reports on the NCQG, facilitating information to the public, and ensuring all NCQG elements are adequately reflected through the ETF.

Although Parties generally agree that accountability and transparency processes should be built upon existing systems, they disagree about the importance of a unified definition of climate finance as well as what that unified definition might look like. As described in the SCF’s report on progress toward achieving the $100 billion goal, countries can still determine their own methodologies to track, measure, report, and define climate finance, which presents challenges to aggregating climate finance data provided under the NCQG (SCF 2022).

AOSIS and the LDC Group have raised the importance of a common method for tracking climate finance provided under the NCQG (AOSIS 2022; LDC Group 2022). AGN has also highlighted the importance of having clear definitions of what is considered “new and additional” finance compared to development finance and what it means to effectively “provide and mobilize” climate finance. Clarity on definitions and tracking methods may promote consistent, comparable information and help avoid double counting (AGN 2022). To date, developed countries have discretion to classify flows as new and additional in their BRs. This discretion allows them to report climate finance already mobilized as development flows within official development assistance as additional and new. For example, the Inter national Expert Group on Climate Finance has stated that there is an overlap between climate and development finance, which has increased because climate investments tend to serve both purposes (Bhattacharya et al. 2020).

According to the fourth BR, Parties emphasized that reporting on private flows is voluntary and no internationally agreed standard exists for tracking private climate finance (except for OECD efforts). A standard guideline or methodology on how countries could track this source is still needed. Between the third and fourth BR, the number of Parties not providing information on private sector finance (neither qualitative nor quantitative) fell from 16 out of 42 to 10 out of 41.

What’s at stake?

The NCQG is not mentioned under the Paris Agreement, and there is no standing mandate to make use of existing processes and procedures. Drawing lessons from the $100 billion goal experience, Parties appear to agree that the NCQG should be established in conjunction with an official transparency mechanism under the Paris Agreement to efficiently monitor progress toward the goal, proactively identify challenges for mobilizing and providing finance, and identify measures for addressing them.

Developed countries still have general discretion to report resources as either committed, disbursed, or climate specific and to report mobilized support as new and additional. In addition, the modalities, procedures, and guidelines for reporting do not provide specific instructions on how financial instruments should be taken into consideration, nor do they specifically spell out a mandate for reporting on the NCQG. Thus, a long list of assumptions, definitions, and methodologies depend on the discretion of each country, which could prevent aggregate, comparable data.

Transparency arrangements for the new goal need to ensure that data are comparable, accurate, and consistent and accurately reflect what has been provided and mobilized, especially if the ETF is selected as the main transparency arrangement for the NCQG and the GST as the report to assess progress every five years toward the goal (see Figure 8).

Agreeing on a new goal will mean discussing and coming to an agreement on a variety of complex factors, including—but also going beyond—setting a numeric value for the goal. These factors range from who should provide funding to how it should be distributed and monitored. Parties will need to determine how funding will be distributed between adaptation, mitigation, or L&D. And they will need to agree upon how big the goal should be in terms of monetary value. But the question of the goal’s size is arguably the central question facing negotiators. Coming to agreement will involve understanding the needs and priorities of developing countries, which will continue to intensify as climate impacts continue to exacerbate. Although not directly addressed in this paper, the NCQG will also need to consider the quality of climate finance, including addressing the significant barriers to accessing climate and the financial instruments through which funding is delivered.

The NCQG process can benefit from finding synergies with existing processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement. Some topics that may have an impact on the NCQG are also under negotiation in parallel with the NCQG, including L&D finance, operationalization of Article 2.1c, and the ETF. To prevent overlap and ensure consistency, the NCQG process could benefit from having joint technical discussions to address information gaps and inform the options for each element under consideration.

To outline a path to final agreement, TEDs need to narrow the conversations and identify consensus and divergence. Moving forward, more focused and concrete deliberations can be structured upon all Party and non-Party submissions to identify consensus, discard certain options, and find where bridges need to be developed. To complement this analysis, a list of definitions and concepts could help guide the deliberations (e.g., mobilization, provision, developed countries, climate finance investments, needs) because often Parties and non-Parties have different understandings of the same concept. These discussions should address and delineate the challenges of each alternative to move forward and inform upcoming climate finance negotiations. Future dialogues should build upon existing submissions to inform the NCQG process and prepare assessment reports.

Regular consultations should be structured to directly inform and complement the NCQG deliberation process. Regular consultations with constituted bodies are a component of the AHWP. How these consultations take place, and their outcomes, could be communicated on a recurrent basis to inform TEDs, submissions, high-level ministerial sessions, and other interactions that will ultimately inform the NCQG negotiations. These regular consultations will also benefit from a structure that clearly identifies the specific NCQG elements (e.g., quantum, time frame, etc.) they contribute.

Country Code	Country	Cumulative CO₂ (kt), 1990–2019	GNI per capita 2022 (US$)	GNI per capita 2022 (Ranking)	HDI 2020 (Ranking)
CHN	China	180,722,829	12,850	73	82
USA	United States	158,317,881	76,370	6	21
RUS	Russian Federation	50,028,670	12,830	74	49
IND	India	39,882,730	2,380	168	130
JPN	Japan	35,076,590	42,440	30	19
DEU	Germany	24,367,020	53,390	19	7
CAN	Canada	15,436,500	52,960	20	15
GBR	United Kingdom	14,824,210	48,890	24	17
KOR	Korea, Rep.	14,407,270	35,990	34	20
ITA	Italy	12,092,300	37,700	33	32
MEX	Mexico	12,061,160	10,410	86	88
ZAF	South Africa	10,590,620	6,780	114	102
FRA	France	10,543,270	45,860	27	28
IDN	Indonesia	10,537,130	4,580	138	116
AUS	Australia	10,421,950	60,430	13	5
SAU	Saudi Arabia	10,411,920	27,590	43	38
BRA	Brazil	10,285,350	8,140	102	86
UKR	Ukraine	9,787,780	4,270	139	78
POL	Poland	9,427,510	18,350	59	36
ESP	Spain	8,148,010	31,680	36	27
TUR	Turkey	7,654,740	10,590	84	48
THA	Thailand	5,962,840	7,230	110	64
KAZ	Kazakhstan	5,781,750	9,470	91	59
NLD	Netherlands	4,828,430	57,430	14	10
EGY	Egypt, Arab Rep.	4,778,140	4,100	144	97
MYS	Malaysia	4,726,920	11,780	77	61
ARG	Argentina	4,374,320	11,620	79	47
VEN	Venezuela, RB	4,126,760	-	263	118
ARE	United Arab Emirates	3,725,520	48,950	23	25
PAK	Pakistan	3,644,140	1,580	193	161
CZE	Czechia	3,514,870	26,590	45	30
UZB	Uzbekistan	3,472,670	2,190	174	107
VNM	Vietnam	3,287,630	4,010	146	113
BEL	Belgium	3,206,550	48,700	25	16
DZA	Algeria	3,119,610	3,900	149	96
IRQ	Iraq	3,115,860	5,270	133	122
ROU	Romania	2,911,400	15,660	65	53
NGA	Nigeria	2,851,100	2,140	177	163
GRC	Greece	2,522,080	21,740	51	33
PHL	Philippines	2,406,870	3,950	147	113
PRK	Korea, Dem. People’s Rep.	2,000,130	-	255	-
AUT	Austria	1,972,000	56,140	15	23
COL	Colombia	1,904,850	6,510	118	88
BLR	Belarus	1,852,060	7,240	109	60
KWT	Kuwait	1,847,130	39,570	32	54
CHL	Chile	1,781,930	15,360	66	43
ISR	Israel	1,735,090	54,650	16	22
FIN	Finland	1,666,100	54,360	18	12
PRT	Portugal	1,588,620	25,800	46	39
HUN	Hungary	1,587,850	19,010	58	44
TKM	Turkmenistan	1,524,150	-	261	93
DNK	Denmark	1,511,560	73,200	8	5
SWE	Sweden	1,479,820	62,990	12	9
BGR	Bulgaria	1,457,500	13,250	71	64
SRB	Serbia	1,451,360	9,140	94	62
QAT	Qatar	1,398,360	70,500	9	42
MAR	Morocco	1,292,710	3,710	155	122
CHE	Switzerland	1,290,330	89,450	4	3
SYR	Syrian Arab Republic	1,275,750	-	260	152
SGP	Singapore	1,201,560	67,200	11	10
OMN	Oman	1,173,600	20,150	53	51
BGD	Bangladesh	1,166,460	2,820	162	128
IRL	Ireland	1,160,020	81,070	5	8
SVK	Slovak Republic	1,143,980	22,060	50	40
NOR	Norway	1,087,910	95,510	2	1
PER	Peru	1,082,420	6,770	116	85
AZE	Azerbaijan	979,830	5,630	126	100
NZL	New Zealand	896,770	48,460	26	13
ECU	Ecuador	868,450	6,310	119	99
CUB	Cuba	800,550	-	237	73
TUN	Tunisia	688,230	3,840	151	94
BHR	Bahrain	627,630	27,180	44	35
JOR	Jordan	555,120	4,260	140	104
AGO	Angola	553,170	1,900	182	149
HRV	Croatia	546,570	19,470	55	41
LBN	Lebanon	545,700	-	247	103
DOM	Dominican Republic	544,600	9,050	96	82
EST	Estonia	539,470	27,640	42	30
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	498,560	7,660	104	73
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	471,790	16,330	64	56
SVN	Slovenia	443,170	30,600	39	23
LTU	Lithuania	421,160	23,690	49	34
MNG	Mongolia	400,310	4,210	141	90
BOL	Bolivia	398,070	3,450	159	119
ZWE	Zimbabwe	381,210	1,500	196	145
LKA	Sri Lanka	376,630	3,610	157	75
MMR	Myanmar	356,640	1,210	204	145
SDN	Sudan	332,710	760	218	171
GTM	Guatemala	318,760	5,350	129	133
MDA	Moldova	312,960	5,340	130	81
KEN	Kenya	312,410	2,170	175	150
LUX	Luxembourg	301,880	91,200	3	17
GHA	Ghana	272,250	2,350	170	135
LVA	Latvia	266,580	21,500	52	37
JAM	Jamaica	265,480	5,670	124	110
GEO	Georgia	261,580	5,620	127	64
MKD	North Macedonia	261,080	6,640	117	79
KGZ	Kyrgyz Republic	250,470	1,410	198	121
PAN	Panama	213,220	16,750	63	67
CYP	Cyprus	208,310	30,540	40	29
ETH	Ethiopia	201,770	1,020	210	175
HND	Honduras	200,320	2,740	163	138
CMR	Cameroon	188,960	1,660	186	150
CIV	Côte d’Ivoire	188,250	2,620	165	-
CRI	Costa Rica	183,860	12,670	76	57
SLV	El Salvador	177,360	4,720	136	124
TZA	Tanzania	177,130	1,200	206	-
URY	Uruguay	176,480	18,030	61	55
BRN	Brunei Darussalam	173,420	31,410	38	49
SEN	Senegal	170,990	1,640	187	170
ARM	Armenia	170,760	5,960	121	87
GAB	Gabon	166,300	7,540	105	113
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	157,000	5,320	131	147
PRY	Paraguay	136,610	5,920	122	100
NPL	Nepal	136,440	1,340	201	144
KHM	Cambodia	136,180	1,700	185	148
BWA	Botswana	131,520	7,350	107	110
PNG	Papua New Guinea	129,340	2,730	164	157
COG	Congo, Rep.	128,630	2,060	179	153
TJK	Tajikistan	127,070	1,210	205	126
LAO	Lao PDR	120,900	2,360	169	-
NIC	Nicaragua	119,380	2,090	178	129
ALB	Albania	112,550	6,770	115	68
AFG	Afghanistan	95,460	-	232	177
ZMB	Zambia	94,410	1,170	208	154
BEN	Benin	93,380	1,400	199	166
MUS	Mauritius	84,430	10,760	83	62
MOZ	Mozambique	83,620	500	227	184
NAM	Namibia	78,660	4,880	134	134
UGA	Uganda	75,740	930	213	166
COD	Congo, Dem. Rep.	74,760	590	224	-
BHS	Bahamas, The	73,320	31,530	37	58
MLT	Malta	69,690	33,550	35	26
ISL	Iceland	61,520	68,220	10	2
MRT	Mauritania	59,070	2,160	176	158
SUR	Suriname	58,950	4,880	135	92
MDG	Madagascar	58,730	510	225	173
MNE	Montenegro	58,260	10,400	87	52
GIN	Guinea	58,160	1,180	207	182
MLI	Mali	57,980	850	214	186
HTI	Haiti	57,420	1,610	192	162
BFA	Burkina Faso	53,590	840	215	185
GUY	Guyana	52,170	15,050	67	107
TGO	Togo	48,430	990	211	163
BRB	Barbados	42,830	19,350	56	71
NER	Niger	32,690	610	223	189
FJI	Fiji	31,850	5,270	132	94
TCD	Chad	28,950	690	220	190
SSD	South Sudan	28,210	-	258	191
MWI	Malawi	25,650	640	222	169
MDV	Maldives	24,460	11,030	82	97
LBR	Liberia	20,640	680	221	179
RWA	Rwanda	20,270	930	212	165
SWZ	Eswatini	20,220	3,800	152	-
SOM	Somalia	18,380	470	229	-
ERI	Eritrea	18,240	-	240	176
SLE	Sierra Leone	16,710	510	226	181
BLZ	Belize	16,320	6,800	113	120
AND	Andorra	14,630	-	233	45
LSO	Lesotho	14,490	1,260	202	168
LCA	St. Lucia	14,000	11,160	81	104
ATG	Antigua and Barbuda	12,970	18,280	60	71
BTN	Bhutan	12,130	-	235	125
DJI	Djibouti	11,990	3,180	161	171
SYC	Seychelles	10,970	14,340	68	69
GMB	Gambia, The	10,710	810	217	-
CPV	Cabo Verde	10,610	4,140	142	127
BDI	Burundi	8,450	240	230	187
SLB	Solomon Islands	8,430	2,220	173	155
GRD	Grenada	7,830	9,340	92	70
VCT	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	7,010	9,110	95	82
KNA	St. Kitts and Nevis	6,770	19,730	54	-
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	6,550	820	216	177
TLS	Timor-Leste	6,330	1,970	180	140
PLW	Palau	6,160	-	254	80
LIE	Liechtenstein	6,000	-	248	14
CAF	Central African Republic	5,860	480	228	188
WSM	Samoa	5,420	3,630	156	112
DMA	Dominica	4,580	8,460	99	106
COM	Comoros	4,220	1,610	191	156
FSM	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	3,870	4,130	143	-
MHL	Marshall Islands	3,570	7,920	103	131
TON	Tonga	3,460	-	262	90
VUT	Vanuatu	3,200	3,560	158	142
STP	São Tomé-et-Príncipe	2,440	2,410	167	139
NRU	Nauru	2,260	17,870	62	-
KIR	Kiribati	1,460	3,280	160	137
TUV	Tuvalu	300	7,210	111	131
COK	Cook Islands	-	-	-	-
NIU	Niue	-	-	-	-
VAT	Holy See	-	-	-	-
MCO	Monaco	-	-	251	-
SMR	San Marino	-	-	257	46
PSE	State of Palestine	-	4610	137	-

Notes: Dashes (-) indicate that information is not available. GNI = gross national income; HDI = Human Development Index; kt = kiloton.

Source: WRI authors; economy classification and per capita CO₂ data extracted from World Bank (n.d.a), CO₂ emissions from World Bank (n.d.b), HDI from UNDP (n.d.), and list of countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement extracted from UN Treaty Collection (2023).

Country Code	Country Name	Per Capita (average)	GNI per capita 2022 (US$)	GNI per capita 2022 (ranking)	HDI 2020 (ranking)
QAT	Qatar	40	70,500	9	42
ARE	United Arab Emirates	26	48,950	23	25
KWT	Kuwait	24	39,570	32	54
BHR	Bahrain	23	27,180	44	35
LUX	Luxembourg	22	91,200	3	17
USA	United States	19	76,370	6	21
AUS	Australia	17	60,430	13	5
CAN	Canada	16	52,960	20	15
BRN	Brunei Darussalam	16	31,410	38	49
SAU	Saudi Arabia	14	27,590	43	38
EST	Estonia	13	27,640	42	30
OMN	Oman	13	20,150	53	51
KAZ	Kazakhstan	12	9,470	91	59
RUS	Russian Federation	12	12,830	74	49
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	12	16,330	64	56
CZE	Czechia	12	26,590	45	30
PLW	Palau	12	-	254	80
FIN	Finland	11	54,360	18	12
TKM	Turkmenistan	10	-	261	93
BEL	Belgium	10	48,700	25	16
NLD	Netherlands	10	57,430	14	10
DEU	Germany	10	53,390	19	7
KOR	Korea, Rep.	10	35,990	34	20
IRL	Ireland	10	81,070	5	8
DNK	Denmark	10	73,200	8	5
JPN	Japan	10	42,440	30	19
SGP	Singapore	9	67,200	11	10
ISR	Israel	9	54,650	16	22
POL	Poland	9	18,350	59	36
GBR	United Kingdom	8	48,890	24	17
AUT	Austria	8	56,140	15	23
GRC	Greece	8	21,740	51	33
NOR	Norway	8	95,510	2	1
SVN	Slovenia	8	30,600	39	23
NZL	New Zealand	8	48,460	26	13
NRU	Nauru	7	17,870	62	-
BHS	Bahamas, The	7	31,530	37	58
ZAF	South Africa	7	6,780	114	102
SVK	Slovak Republic	7	22,060	50	40
AND	Andorra	7	-	233	45
ISL	Iceland	7	68,220	10	2
ITA	Italy	7	37,700	33	32
CYP	Cyprus	7	30,540	40	29
UKR	Ukraine	7	4,270	139	78
SRB	Serbia	7	9,140	94	62
BLR	Belarus	7	7,240	109	60
ESP	Spain	7	31,680	36	27
BGR	Bulgaria	6	13,250	71	64
LIE	Liechtenstein	6	-	248	14
MYS	Malaysia	6	11,780	77	61
MLT	Malta	6	33,550	35	26
CHE	Switzerland	6	89,450	4	3
FRA	France	6	45,860	27	28
SWE	Sweden	6	62,990	12	9
ATG	Antigua and Barbuda	6	18,280	60	71
BRB	Barbados	5	19,350	56	71
VEN	Venezuela, RB	5	-	263	118
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	5	5,320	131	147
HUN	Hungary	5	19,010	58	44
PRT	Portugal	5	25,800	46	39
MNG	Mongolia	5	4,210	141	90
KNA	St. Kitts and Nevis	5	19,730	54	-
CHN	China	5	12,850	73	82
ROU	Romania	5	15,660	65	53
UZB	Uzbekistan	5	2,190	174	107
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	7,660	104	73
MKD	North Macedonia	4	6,640	117	79
SYC	Seychelles	4	14,340	68	69
LTU	Lithuania	4	23,690	49	34
HRV	Croatia	4	19,470	55	41
AZE	Azerbaijan	4	5,630	126	100
SUR	Suriname	4	4,880	135	92
LVA	Latvia	4	21,500	52	37
GAB	Gabon	4	7,540	105	113
MEX	Mexico	4	10,410	86	88
ARG	Argentina	4	11,620	79	47
LBN	Lebanon	4	-	247	103
IRQ	Iraq	4	5,270	133	122
TUR	Turkey	4	10,590	84	48
CHL	Chile	4	15,360	66	43
MDA	Moldova	4	5,340	130	81
JAM	Jamaica	3	5,670	124	110
MNE	Montenegro	3	10,400	87	52
DZA	Algeria	3	3,900	149	96
THA	Thailand	3	7,230	110	64
JOR	Jordan	3	4,260	140	104
PRK	Korea, Dem. People’s Rep.	3	-	255	-
LCA	St. Lucia	3	11,160	81	104
SYR	Syrian Arab Republic	3	-	260	152
CUB	Cuba	2	-	237	73
GRD	Grenada	2	9,340	92	70
MHL	Marshall Islands	2	7,920	103	131
MUS	Mauritius	2	10,760	83	62
GUY	Guyana	2	15,050	67	107
BWA	Botswana	2	7,350	107	110
MDV	Maldives	2	11,030	82	97
DMA	Dominica	2	8,460	99	106
TUN	Tunisia	2	3,840	151	94
VCT	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	2	9,110	95	82
PAN	Panama	2	16,750	63	67
ECU	Ecuador	2	6,310	119	99
GEO	Georgia	2	5,620	127	64
BLZ	Belize	2	6,800	113	120
DOM	Dominican Republic	2	9,050	96	82
EGY	Egypt, Arab Rep.	2	4,100	144	97
BRA	Brazil	2	8,140	102	86
ARM	Armenia	2	5,960	121	87
URY	Uruguay	2	18,030	61	55
KGZ	Kyrgyz Republic	2	1,410	198	121
COL	Colombia	2	6,510	118	88
IDN	Indonesia	2	4,580	138	116
CRI	Costa Rica	1	12,670	76	57
MAR	Morocco	1	3,710	155	122
BOL	Bolivia	1	3,450	159	119
NAM	Namibia	1	4,880	134	134
PER	Peru	1	6,770	116	85
ALB	Albania	1	6,770	115	68
VNM	Vietnam	1	4,010	146	113
FJI	Fiji	1	5,270	132	94
FSM	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	1	4,130	143	-
COG	Congo, Rep.	1	2,060	179	153
IND	India	1	2,380	168	130
TON	Tonga	1	-	262	90
ZWE	Zimbabwe	1	1,500	196	145
TUV	Tuvalu	1	7,210	111	131
SLV	El Salvador	1	4,720	136	124
WSM	Samoa	1	3,630	156	112
PHL	Philippines	1	3,950	147	113
AGO	Angola	1	1,900	182	149
HND	Honduras	1	2,740	163	138
PRY	Paraguay	1	5,920	122	100
GTM	Guatemala	1	5,350	129	133
NIC	Nicaragua	1	2,090	178	129
CPV	Cabo Verde	1	4,140	142	127
PAK	Pakistan	1	1,580	193	161
NGA	Nigeria	1	2,140	177	163
SWZ	Eswatini	1	3,800	152	-
PNG	Papua New Guinea	1	2,730	164	157
LKA	Sri Lanka	1	3,610	157	75
TJK	Tajikistan	1	1,210	205	126
MRT	Mauritania	1	2,160	176	158
LAO	Lao PDR	1	2,360	169	-
BTN	Bhutan	1	-	235	125
SLB	Solomon Islands	1	2,220	173	155
DJI	Djibouti	1	3,180	161	171
SEN	Senegal	0	1,640	187	170
KIR	Kiribati	0	3,280	160	137
STP	São Tomé-et-Príncipe	0	2,410	167	139
VUT	Vanuatu	0	3,560	158	142
GHA	Ghana	0	2,350	170	135
CMR	Cameroon	0	1,660	186	150
SDN	Sudan	0	760	218	171
BEN	Benin	0	1,400	199	166
CIV	Côte d’Ivoire	0	2,620	165	-
KHM	Cambodia	0	1,700	185	148
KEN	Kenya	0	2,170	175	150
TGO	Togo	0	990	211	163
BGD	Bangladesh	0	2,820	162	128
ZMB	Zambia	0	1,170	208	154
MMR	Myanmar	0	1,210	204	145
LSO	Lesotho	0	1,260	202	168
ERI	Eritrea	0	-	240	176
COM	Comoros	0	1,610	191	156
GMB	Gambia, The	0	810	217	-
HTI	Haiti	0	1,610	192	162
GIN	Guinea	0	1,180	207	182
LBR	Liberia	0	680	221	179
TLS	Timor-Leste	0	1,970	180	140
NPL	Nepal	0	1,340	201	144
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	0	820	216	177
TZA	Tanzania	0	1,200	206	-
AFG	Afghanistan	0	-	232	177
MOZ	Mozambique	0	500	227	184
MLI	Mali	0	850	214	186
BFA	Burkina Faso	0	840	215	185
SSD	South Sudan	0	-	258	191
MDG	Madagascar	0	510	225	173
SLE	Sierra Leone	0	510	226	181
TCD	Chad	0	690	220	190
UGA	Uganda	0	930	213	166
ETH	Ethiopia	0	1,020	210	175
RWA	Rwanda	0	930	212	165
NER	Niger	0	610	223	189
MWI	Malawi	0	640	222	169
SOM	Somalia	0	470	229	-
CAF	Central African Republic	0	480	228	188
COD	Congo, Dem. Rep.	0	590	224	-
BDI	Burundi	0	240	230	187
COK	Cook Islands	-	-	-	-
NIU	Niue	-	-	-	-
VAT	Holy See	-	-	-	-
MCO	Monaco	-	-	251	-
SMR	San Marino	-	-	257	46
PSE	State of Palestine	-	4,610	137	-

Group	GNI per capita
High income	>13,205
Upper-middle income	4,256–13,205
Lower-middle income	1,086–4,255
Low income	<1,085

Notes: Dashes (-) indicate that information is not available. GNI = gross national income; HDI = Human Development Index; kt = kiloton. Countries that show 0 per capita emissions are a result of rounding.

ABUArgentina, Brazil, and Uruguay

AGNAfrican Group of Negotiators on Climate Change

AHWPad hoc work program

AILACAsociación Independiente de Latinoamérica y el Caribe (Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean)

AOSISAlliance of Small Island States

BAbiennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows

BRbiennial report

BTRbiennial transparency report

BURbiennial update report

CBDR-RCcommon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities

CMAConference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement

COPConference of the Parties

CO₂carbon dioxide

CTFcommon tabular format

ETCEnergy Transition Committee

ETFenhanced transparency framework

GDPgross domestic product

GHGgreenhouse gas

GNIgross national income

GSTGlobal Stocktake

HDIHuman Development Index

HLMDhigh-level ministerial dialogue

IAMintegrated assessment model

IPCCIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IRENAInternational Renewable Energy Agency

ktkiloton

L&Dloss and damage

LCD GroupLeast Developed Countries Group

MDBmultilateral development bank

MOFMinistry of Finance

NCQGnew collective quantified goal

NDCnationally determined contribution

OECDOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

SCFStanding Committee on Finance

TEDtechnical expert dialogue

UNEPUnited Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCCUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

ABU (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay). 2022. New Collective Quantified Goal: Submission by Brazil on Behalf of ABU (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay). Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202203160906---ABU%20-%20Submission%20NCQG.pdf.

AG (Arab Group). 2023. Saudi Arabia on Behalf of the Arab Group: Submission on the Sixth Technical Expert Dialogue under the Ad Hoc Work Programme of the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202305151155---20230805_Draft_Arab_Group_Submission_NCQG_TED6_vF.pdf?_gl=1*1ou8prc*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgynjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5NTYxMDQyMy4yMjcuMS4xNjk1NjEwNzQ1LjAuMC4w.

AGN (African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change). 2022. Submission by the Republic of Zambia on Behalf of the African Group of Negotiators: Views on the New Collective Mobilization Goal on Climate Finance. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/AGN%20submission%20on%20the%20New%20Goal.pdf.

AGN. 2023. Submission by the Republic of Zambia on Behalf of the African Group of Negotiators: Submission on the Sixth Technical Expert Dialogue under the Ad Hoc Work Programme of the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202305151155---20230805_Draft_Arab_Group_Submission_NCQG_TED6_vF.pdf?_gl=1*grjjo7*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5NTQ4NzA1NS4yMjQuMC4xNjk1NDg3MDU1LjAuMC4w.

AILAC (Asociación Independiente de Latinoamérica y el Caribe). 2022. Submission by Colombia on Behalf of the AILAC Group of Countries Composed by Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and Peru: New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202208231116---AILAC%20submission%20on%20the%20new%20goal%20on%20finance_needs%20and%20priorities.pdf?_gl=1*5ctt3k*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5NTQ4NzA1NS4yMjQuMS4xNjk1NDg5MDIxLjAuMC4w

AILAC. 2023. Submission by Costa Rica on Behalf of the AILAC Group of Countries Composed by Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and Peru: New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202305160555---AILAC%20-%20TED%206%20submission.pdf?_gl=1*t3b8x4*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5ODExNjAzNC4yODguMC4xNjk4MTE2MDM0LjAuMC4w.

Alayza, N., P. Bhandari, D. Burns, N. Cogswell, K. de Zoysa, M. Finch, T. Fransen, et al. 2022. “COP27: Key Takeaways and What’s Next.” Insights (blog), World Resources Institute, December 8. https://www.wri.org/insights/cop27-key-outcomes-un-climate-talks-sharm-el-sheikh.

AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States). 2022. Submission: New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202203061139---AOSIS%20-%20CC%20Finance%20-%20NCQG%20on%20Climate%20Finance%20-%20Submission%20-%20Initial%20Views%20-%202022-03-06.pdf.

Argueta, B., R. Pandit Chhetri, D. Eckstein, and M. Köhler. 2021. “Access to Climate Finance for the Most Vulnerable.” Policy Brief. Bonn, Germany: Climate Finance Advisory Service. https://www.cfas.info/sites/default/files/anhang/CFAS_Policy_Brief_Access_to_climate_finance_0.pdf.

Argueta, B., B. Dransfeld, D. Eckstein, J. Grimm, M. Köhler, and D. Ryfisch. 2022. “Process Proposal for Defining the New Collective Quantified Goal.” Climate Finance Advisory Service Policy Brief. Cape Town: Climate and Development Knowledge Network. https://cfas.info/sites/default/files/anhang/CFAS_Policy_Brief_Process%20Proposal%20for%20Defining%20the%20New%20Collective%20Quantified%20Goal.pdf.

Baarsch, F., T. Lissner, C.-F. Schleussner, J. Granadillos, K. de Bruin, M. Perrette, M. Schaeffer, and B. Hare. 2015. Impacts of Low Aggregate INDCs Ambition: Research Commissioned by Oxfam. Berlin: Climate Analytics. https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/impacts-of-low-aggregate-indcs-ambition-research-commissioned-by-oxfam-582427/.

Bhattacharya, A., R. Calland, A. Averchenkova, L. Gonzalez, L. Martinez-Diaz, and J. Van Rooij. 2020. Delivering on the $100 Billion Climate Finance Commitment and Transforming Climate Finance. New York: Independent Expert Group on Climate Finance, United Nations. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2020/12/100_billion_climate_finance_report.pdf.

Bos, J., and J. Thwaites. 2021. “A Breakdown of Developed Countries’ Climate Finance Contributions towards the $100 Billion Goal.” Technical Note. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. https://doi.org/10.46830/writn.20.00145.

Bos. J., and L. Gonzalez. 2022. “4 Key Accountability Standards the SCF Progress Report Should Consider.” Insights (blog), World Resources Institute, March 17. https://www.wri.org/insights/4-standards-scf-report-should-consider.

Caldwell, M., and N. Alayza. 2023. “Landscape of Assessments on the Quantum of Finance Needed to Address Climate Action.” Presentation at the Sixth Technical Expert Dialogue, “New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance,” Bonn, Germany, June 12. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/TED%206_Climate%20Finance%20Needs%20v.%20Final%2006.11.pdf?_gl=1*7qopln*_ga*MtcyMjk2NDc2OS4xNjg1MDIxOTUz*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY4Njg0MTQyMC44NS4xLjE2ODY4NDE5NjIuMC4wLjA.

Chapagain, D., F. Baarsch, M. Schaeffer, and S. D’haen. 2020. “Climate Change Adaptation Costs in Developing Countries: Insights from Existing Estimates.” Climate and Development 12 (10): 934–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2020.1711698.

Climate Watch. n.d. “Explore Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).” https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ndcs-explore. Accessed August 2023.

COP26 (26th Conference of the Parties) Presidency. 2021. Climate Finance Delivery Plan: Meeting the US$100 Billion Goal. London: COP26 Presidency. https://ukcop26.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Climate-Finance-Delivery-Plan-1.pdf.

Cozzi, P., R. Narvaez, F. Osses, M. Eyassu Melkie, and C. Nguyen. 2022. “The New Goal on Climate Finance: It’s about Quantity and Quality!” Technical Paper. Basalt, CO: Climate Finance Access Network, RMI. https://cfanadvisors.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/SECOND-TECHNICAL-PAPER-V5.pdf.

Dagnet, Y., N. Cogswell, N. Bird, M. Bouyé, and M. Rocha. 2019. “Building Capacity for the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework: What Can We Learn from Countries’ Experiences and UNFCCC Processes?” Working paper. Washington, DC: Project for Advancing Climate Transparency. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/building-capacity-paris-agreements-enhanced-transparency-framework.pdf.

ECCC (Environment and Climate Change Canada) and Federal Foreign Office. 2022. Climate Finance Delivery Plan Progress Report: Advancing the Ten Collective Actions. Quebec: ECCC, Government of Canada; Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, Government of Germany. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/canada-international-action/climate-finance/delivery-plan/progress-report-2022.html.

EIG (Environmental Integrity Group). 2022. First EIG Submission on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202203081632---First%20EIG%20Submission%20on%20the%20New%20Collective%20Quantified%20Goal%20on%20Climate%20Finance.pdf.

ETC (Energy Transitions Committee). 2023. Financing the Transition: How to Make the Money Flow for a Net-Zero Economy. London: ETC. https://www.energy-transitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/ETC-Financing-the-Transition-MainReport_update.pdf.

European Union. 2023a. Submission by Sweden and the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union and Its Member States: EU’s Views on the 2023 work Plan for New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202302061016---SE-2023-02-06%20EU%20submission_NCQG_WP_230131.pdf?_gl=1*16tg61e*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5NDY2ODExMC4yMDAuMS4xNjk0NjcwNjMzLjAuMC4w.

European Union. 2023b. Submission by Sweden and the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union and Its Member States: Sixth Technical Expert Dialogue (TED6) under the Ad Hoc Work Programme on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202302061016---SE-2023-02-06%20EU%20submission_NCQG_WP_230131.pdf?_gl=1*kou1p9*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5Njk4MDg3Ny4yNzIuMS4xNjk2OTgwOTc0LjAuMC4w.

Federal Foreign Office. 2023. “Open Letter: Canada and Germany’s Way Forward on Climate Finance in 2023.” Press Release, September 15. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2616670.

Government of Canada. 2023. Canada’s Submission on the 2023 Workplan of the Ad Hoc Work Programme for the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance and Its Fifth Technical Expert Dialogue. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202303010949---NCQG%20February%202023%20Canada%20EN.pdf?_gl=1*omyl9o*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5ODEwODM5MS4yODYuMS4xNjk4MTEwODA0LjAuMC4w.

Government of Japan. 2023. Submission by Japan on the 2023 Work Plan of the Ad Hoc Work Programme on the New Collective Quantified Goal. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202302062044---Japan_Submission_NCQG_Workplan_2023.pdf?_gl=1*10k3m4y*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5ODEwODM5MS4yODYuMS4xNjk4MTA4NzE2LjAuMC4w.

Government of New Zealand. 2023. Submission on the Issues to Be Addressed as Part of the NCQG Work Plan Referred to in Paragraph 11(a) of FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/L.19. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202303061039---New%20Zealand%20NCQG%20Workplan%20Submission%20March%202023.pdf?_gl=1*1bd8e8b*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5ODExNjAzNC4yODguMC4xNjk4MTE2MDg4LjAuMC4w.

Government of Norway. 2023. New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG): “Quantity, Mobilisation, and Provision of Financial Sources”—Submission from Norway on Issues for the 6th Technical Expert Dialogue (TED). Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202305161235---New%20Collective%20Quantified%20Goal.%20Issues%20for%20the%206th%20TED_Norway.pdf?_gl=1*wdv8jh*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5NTQ5MjQ5MS4yMjUuMS4xNjk1NDkyNTE2LjAuMC4w.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2021. World Economic Outlook: Managing Divergent Recoveries. Washington, DC: IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/ Issues/2021/03/23/world-economic-outlook-april-2021.

IMF. 2022a. Fiscal Monitor: Helping People Bounce Back. Washington, DC: IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2022/10/09/fiscal-monitor-october-22.

IMF. 2022b. 2022 Global Debt Monitor. Washington, DC: IMF. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Conferences/2022/12/2022-12-12-global-debt-monitor.ashx.

IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2022. IPCC Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, et al. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press. https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg2/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf.

IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency). 2023. World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023: 1.5°C Pathway. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. https://mc-cd8320d4-36a1-40ac-83cc-3389-cdn-endpoint.azureedge.net/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2023/Jun/IRENA_World_energy_transitions_outlook_v1_2023.pdf?rev=cc4522ff897a4e26a47906447c74bca6.

LDC (Least Developed Countries) Group. 2022. “Submission by the Senegal on Behalf of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) on New Collective Quantified Goal.” Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202203071355---LDC%20Submission_CC%20Finance_NCQG_20220307.pdf.

LMDC (Like-Minded Developing Countries Group). 2023. “India on Behalf of Like-Minded Developing Countries Group (LMDC): Submission on the Sixth Technical Expert Dialogue under the Ad Hoc Work Programme of the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG).” Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202305181618---India_LMDC%20Submission%20NCQG%20TED6.pdf?_gl=1*1xn04cm*_ga*MTQ2MjI5MDE0Ni4xNjY0NDgyNjA1*_ga_7ZZWT14N79*MTY5NTQ4NzA1NS4yMjQuMS4xNjk1NDg3MzUzLjAuMC4w.

Markandya, A., and M. González-Eguino. 2019. “Integrated Assessment for Identifying Climate Finance Needs for Loss and Damage: A Critical Review.” In Loss and Damage from Climate Change, edited by R. Mechler, L. Bouwer, T. Schinko, S. Surminski, and J. Linnerooth-Bayer. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-72026-5_14.

McKinsey & Company. 2022. The Net-Zero Transition: What It Would Cost, What It Could Bring. New York: McKinsey Global Institute, Mc-Kinsey & Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/sustainability/our%20insights/the%20net%20zero%20transition%20what%20it%20would%20cost%20what%20it%20could%20bring/the-net-zero-transition-what-it-would-cost-and-what-it-could-bring-final.pdf.

Mustapha, S. 2022. “Providing Climate Finance in the Context of a Looming Debt Crisis.” ODI, November 11. https://odi.org/en/insights/providing-climate-finance-in-the-context-of-a-looming-debt-crisis/.

Nordhaus, W. 2017. “Integrated Assessment Models of Climate Change.” The Reporter 3 (September). https://www.nber.org/reporter/2017number3/integrated-assessment-models-climate-change.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2022. Aggregate Trends of Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013–2020. Paris: OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/d28f963c-en. https://www.oecd.org/climate-change/finance-usd-100-billion-goal/aggregate-trends-of-climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries-in-2013-2020.pdf

Oliver, P. 2023. “Processes and Data Sources Relevant for Tracking Progress towards the NCQG.” Presentation for the Seventh Technical Expert Dialogue under the Ad Hoc Work Programme on the New Collective Quantified Call. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Oliver_draftTED%207_slides.pdf.

Richards, J.-A., L. Schalatek, L. Achampong, and H. White. 2023. “The Loss and Damage Finance Landscape.” Loss and Damage Collaboration Discussion Paper. Washington, DC: Heinrich Böll Stiftun. https://www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/publication/the-loss-and-damage-finance-landscape.

SCF. 2022. Report on progress towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. Bonn, Germany: SCF, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/J0156_UNFCCC%20100BN%202022%20Report_Book_v3.2

UNDP (United Nations Development Program). n.d. (Database). Human Development Index. https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI. Accessed July 8, 2023.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2022. Adaptation Gap Report 2022: Too Little, Too Slow—Climate Adaptation Failure Puts World at Risk. Nairobi: UNEP. https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2022.

UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 2009. Decision 2/CP.15: Copenhagen Accord. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4.

UNFCCC. 2010. Decision 1/CP.16: The Cancun Agreements—Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/decisions?f%5B0%5D=session%3A3454.

UNFCCC. 2016. Decision 1/CP.21: Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.

UNFCCC. 2021a. Decision 1/CP.26: Glasgow Climate Pact. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/decisions.

UNFCCC. 2021b. First Biennial Communications in Accordance with Article 9, Paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_03E.pdf.

UNFCCC 2022a. Decision 5/CMA.4: New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/documents/626569.

UNFCCC. 2022b. Reference Manual for the Enhanced Transparency Framework under the Paris Agreement: Understanding the Enhanced Transparency Framework and Its Linkages. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/v2_ETFreferencemanual.pdf.

UNFCCC. 2023. “Fifth Technical Expert Dialogue under the Ad Hoc Work Programme on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance.” Summary Note. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC Secretariat.https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SummaryNote_TED5_29March_final.pdf.

UNFCCC. n.d. “New Collective Quantified Goal.” https://unfccc.int/NCQG. Accessed December 22, 2022.

UN (United Nations) Treaty Collection. 2023. “Paris Agreement.” July 9. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en.

U.S. Government. 2022. “Submission of the United States of America: New Collective Quantified Goal.” Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202203131515---03-22_New%20Goal_USA.pdf.

Vivid Economics. 2021. Net Zero Financing Roadmaps: Key Messages. London: Vivid Economics. https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/63/2021/10/NZFRs-Key-Messages.pdf.

Watson, C. 2023. “Options for Embedding Developing Country Needs in the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance.” Working Paper. London: ODI. https://odi.org/en/publications/options-for-embedding-developing-country-needs-in-the-new-collective-quantified-goal-on-climate-finance/.

World Bank. n.d.a. (Database.) World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT. Accessed December 29, 2022.

World Bank. n.d.b. (Database.) New World Bank Country Classifications by Income Level: 2022–2023 of Current Country Classification by Income. https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups. Accessed December 29, 2022.

Context

About this working paper

Methodology

State of play of the $100 billion goal context and challenges

NCQG state of play: The start of formal deliberations and procedural milestones

What should the quantity of the NCQG be, and what role should the quality of finance play?

What is discussed?

Counting the provision versus mobilization of climate finance

Quantum and the needs and priorities of developing countries

Mitigation finance assessments

Adaptation finance assessments

Loss and Damage finance assessments

Setting a numerical figure will not be sufficient; what’s the role of quality?

What’s at stake?

What is discussed?

What’s the role of L&D within the thematic scope?

Dividing the pie between adaptation, mitigation, and L&D

What’s at stake?

Time frame: What time frame should the goal cover?

What is discussed?

An adjustable goal?

What’s at stake?

Contributor: Who should contribute to the NCQG?

What is discussed?

How was the original list of developed countries determined?

What’s at stake?

Transparency arrangements: What type of transparency arrangements should accompany the goal?

What is discussed?

How does reporting work today?

What’s at stake?