Traceability and Transparency_TEST

Chapter 5

Traceability and transparency through the supply chain

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Moving one stage onward in the supply chain discussed in “Availability and usability of data at the point of origin and/or production,” this chapter draws on the case studies presented in Appendices B to F to consider how data collated at the point of origin are transferred and used within commodity supply chains to help halt forest loss and shift to sustainable production.

This chapter considers two questions:

  • What is required to achieve traceability to origin (e.g., to individual plot, plantation, or ranch) and in which cases is it necessary?
  • How easily can decision-makers access and make sense of data on deforestation risk within supply chains?

Commitments to greater traceability and transparency

Most major traders of key commodities and many consumer-facing brands have committed to addressing forest loss (often articulated by private sector actors as commitments to “deforestation and conversion free” supply chains) and developed programs of work to deliver on this. Ambitions on traceability and transparency vary. Table 8 summarizes examples of corporate commodity commitments from key companies and traders.

Table 8 | Examples of corporate commitments across the commodities

Commodity

Example of commitment

Examples of commitments on traceability and transparency

Palm oil

  • Wilmar’s “No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation” policy launched in 2013 and updated in 2019a
  • 100% traceability to palm oil mills by 2022 (approximately 90% as of December 2021 for CPO and PKO) and 90% traceability to oil palm plantations by 2023 (approximately 70% as of June 2022)b
  • Wilmar is making information on all its 800 palm oil suppliers available through an online dashboard: 98.2% traceable to mills across its global operations and 100% traceable to plantations for all Wilmar-owned mills across its global operationsq

Soy

  • Bunge’s commitment to reach deforestation-free value chains in 2025, including soy from the Brazilian Cerrado and the Gran Chaco of Argentina and Paraguayc
  • Trader Roadmap* also sets a 2025 target date for the removal of deforestation for soy production in the Amazon, Cerrado, and Chacod
  • Bunge’s monitoring of direct sources in the priority regions of the Cerrado and Gran Chaco: 2021, 100% target and 100% current status; and monitoring of indirect sources in the priority regions of the Cerrado: 2021, 35% target and 64% current statuse
  • Within the Trader Roadmap, traceability requirements are defined as “traceability to farm based on property boundary data for all origins within high-risk areas”f

Cattle

  • Marfrig’s commitment to eradicating deforestation (legal or illegal) by 2025 in the Amazon and by 2030 in the Cerradog
  • Trader Roadmap has set target dates of 2023 and 2025 (for the Amazon) for no-deforestation (legal or illegal) for direct and indirect suppliers, respectively, and 2025 (for the Cerrado) for illegal deforestation for direct and indirect suppliersh
  • Marfrig progress achieved in 2021: 100% of direct supplier properties monitored; 63% of direct producers, with ranches within the Amazon reported on operations of their own suppliers (Marfrig’s indirect suppliers); 67% of direct suppliers in the Cerrado shared information about their respective supply chainsi
  • Trader Roadmap set a target to enable the traceability of the full cattle supply chain in Brazil by the start of 2023j

Timber

  • Rougier’s strategic collaboration with WWF to advance sustainable forestry, developing an environmental policy based on responsible forest management and responsible trade of forest products
  • It commits to carrying out verification on a regular basis as foreseen by regulations such as FLEGT and the Lacey Actk
  • Rougier Afrique International (a subsidiary of Rougier Group) can guarantee that 100% of its products can be traded with a traceability and legality certificatel

Cocoa

  • Mondelēz International’s Cocoa Life aims to achieve the following goals by 2030:
  • Increase number of farming households receiving a living income
  • Enhance child protection systems and enable access to quality education in Cocoa Life communities
  • Seek no deforestation on Cocoa Life farms globallym
  • As of 2021, 67% (Côte d’Ivoire) and 79% (Ghana) of its directly sourced cocoa was traceable from the farm to the first purchase pointn
  • Mondelēz International’s goal to source its cocoa volume needs through Cocoa Life (its global cocoa sustainability program launched in 2012) by 2025m
  • It has also pledged to develop traceability from farm to the first purchase point for its own purchases of cocoan

Coffee

  • Starbucks commits to ensuring that 100% of its coffee is ethically sourced through C.A.F.E. Practices or another externally audited system
  • C.A.F.E. Practices include guidelines in four key areas: quality, economic accountability and transparency, social responsibility, and environmental leadership (in partnership with Conservation International)o
  • In fiscal year 2021 (FY21), due to restrictions caused by COVID-19, auditing teams were unable to complete all the necessary in-person, on-farm audits to renew its active status in the program; as a result, 94.86% of its coffee in FY21 was sourced from C.A.F.E. Practice–verified farmso

Natural rubber

  • Michelin first adopted “zero deforestation” principles as part of its Natural Rubber Procurement Policy in 2015, and expanded on them in its first Sustainable Natural Rubber Policy in 2016p
  • Michelin will work toward comprehensive disclosure of the provenance of natural rubber purchased from industrial plantations (estates), and for sources other than industrial plantations (including smallholders), will publish jurisdictional-level summaries of the RubberWay risk mappingp

Notes: * The Trader Roadmap aims to accelerate existing action by the agri-commodity sector on deforestation to align with global climate goals in a way that contributes to food security, economic development, and farmer livelihoods. Fourteen agri-commodity traders are working to develop an Agriculture Sector Roadmap to 1.5°C, which was launched at COP27 (see https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/assets/Agriculture-Sector-Roadmap-January-2023_compressed-compressed.pdf); CPO = crude palm oil; PKO = palm kernel oil; WWF = World Wildlife Fund; FLEGT = Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade.

Sources: a. Wilmar 2019; b. See Wilmar’s timebound action plan 2022–2023 at the following link: https://www.wilmar-international.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/sustainability/supply-chain/wilmar-timebound-action-plan-2022—2023.pdf?sfvrsn=377e34bb_2; c. See information on Bunge’s Non-deforestation Commitment here: https://www.bunge.com/Sustainability/Non-Deforestation-Commitment; d. See the Trader Roadmap published on the Tropical Forest Alliance’s website here: https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/assets/Agriculture-Sector-Roadmap-January-2023.pdf; e. Bunge 2022; f. See the Trader Roadmap published on the Tropical Forest Alliance’s website here: https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/assets/Agriculture-Sector-Roadmap-January-2023.pdf; g. Marfrig 2020; h. See the Trader Roadmap published on the Tropical Forest Alliance’s website here: https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/assets/Agriculture-Sector-Roadmap-January-2023.pdf; i. For more information, see Marfrig’s 2021 sustainability report: https://www.marfrig.com.br/en/Lists/CentralConteudo/Attachments/3/Sustainability%20Report%202021.pdf; j. See the Trader Roadmap published on the Tropical Forest Alliance’s website: https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/assets/Agriculture-Sector-Roadmap-January-2023.pdf; k. See the sustainability page on Rougier’s website for more information: http://www.rougier.fr/en/groupe/482-pioneer-sustainable-development-within-african-timber-industry.html; l. See Rougier Afrique’s page on products and species from the Congo Basin for more information: http://www.rougier.fr/en/rougier-afrique-international/478-wide-range-products-and-species-congo-basin.html; m. For more information, see the Cocoa Life website: https://www.cocoalife.org/; n. For more information, see the Starbucks page on the website of the Sustainable Coffee Challenge: https://www.sustaincoffee.org/partners/starbucks; o. Mondelēz 2022; p. Michelin 2021; q. For more information, see Wilmar’s sustainability page: https://www.wilmar-international.com/sustainability.

Table 8 shows that at a high level there are common commitments among some companies to achieve deforestation- and conversion-free supply chains, and that there are common ambitions to traceability and transparency in their individual supply chains.

Traders do make distinctions between their own operations and those of joint ventures, third parties, or indirect suppliers that supply to them, where traceability and transparency are more challenging, as explored below. The Trader Roadmap further distinguishes within the cattle sector between legal and illegal deforestation, and high risk (but not all) biomes.

Traders also have shown varying levels of ambition on traceability scope, for example, traceability to smallholder or plantation (e.g., Musim Mas, see Appendix C),21 traceability to mill and over time to plantation (e.g., Wilmar),22 and traceability “granularity” depending on risk (e.g., ADM, soy).23 Taken together, there is a broad set of corporate commitments reflecting the complexity of global supply chains.

Complex global agricultural and forestry commodity supply chains

Global commodity supply chains are complex and multitiered. This creates challenges for passing on information on commodity characteristics from the point of origin (the data points/indicators discussed in “Availability and usability of data at the point of origin and/or production”) through each tier in the supply chain.

Commodity supply chains vary in their complexity, such as in the degree of vertical integration among tiers and in the prevalence of indirect, third-party, and smallholder suppliers.

Figure 6 shows a generic model of a commodity supply chain, illustrating the common practices of mixing commodities, and changing ownership at different stages in the supply chain. The roles of key parts of the supply chain are also explained.

Figure 6 | Generic supply chain model for palm oil

Traders (or shippers) are key actors in the supply chain. Figure 6 illustrates the common hourglass shape prevalent (to varying degrees) in commodity supply chains (e.g., palm oil, soy) that converge between the initial stages of production & aggregation and transportation & distribution to end use markets. While this shape does vary across commodities, commodity traders or shippers, refiners, and processors are commonly focused on this point of convergence for commodities (a point where a significant share of global commodity trade passes through), which makes their role critical in the commodity supply chain, and in any traceability and transparency system.

Some of the inherent characteristics of commodity trade present challenges for traceability and transparency, in particular the following:

  • Traders can typically buy and sell commodities on the spot market, where available commodities are put up for sale for immediate delivery to manage peak demand or buy at the best value to meet customer requirements. Traceability and transparency within spot market purchases can be more difficult than where traders buy directly from suppliers with which they may have a long-term purchasing agreement with greater built-in traceability and transparency.
  • Trade in commodities has historically (though not in all cases) been based on price, quality, and physical characteristics (e.g., soy to a specific protein level), not on origin and sustainability characteristics. For example, traders, global processors/refiners, or consumer goods companies may buy to a quality specification that permits pooling of commodities sourced from multiple geographies (e.g., soy meeting a specific protein content from “any origin”) in which case this mixing in the supply chains inherently adds complexity in traceability of individual origins.
  • Traders, refiners, and global processors may also buy from cooperatives of farmers or from other third parties (including other traders and intermediaries) that may lack the appropriate incentives (including commercial sensitivities, cost) and resources to disclose their own suppliers.
  • Smallholders make up a significant share of commodity suppliers, growers, and producers in most major commodities. The related complexities and issues are discussed further below.
  • Commodity trade includes not only the raw commodity (soybeans, crude palm oil) but also products derived from processing, such as dried cocoa beans, cocoa butter, processed rubber, refined coffee, and derivatives of palm oil like oleochemicals, which can include many more steps of processing. Beef products such as corned beef can be produced from trimmings from different cattle and from different farms. These examples illustrate the complexity and traceability challenges in typical commodity and commodity-derived product supply chains.
  • Commodities are also embedded within transformed products (e.g., palm oil in baked goods, cocoa in chocolate, rubber in tires, soy in animal feed).

As these points illustrate, commodity supply chains were not designed to meet traceability and transparency requirements for attributes beyond the physical product itself such as legality or safety, but for optimized cost-efficiency. The ability of commodity supply chains to adapt to requirements based either on inherent characteristics or quality or safety specifications does indicate that enhanced protocols for traceability to monitor exposure to forest loss could be pursued.

A retailer wanting to understand its supply chain will therefore need to unpack a long string of documentation about a unit of commodity, produced according to different standards, conventions, and requirements around the world, to map national and subnational origin, and from there identify a pool of potential mills, silos, cooperatives, or other aggregation points, and subsequently farmers or growers.

Changing these supply chains, for example, by physically segregating commodity flows that meet specific criteria from “conventional” flows can make traceability simpler, but can add costs that need to be borne by someone within/or shared across the supply chain. Pursuing segregated flows has also been criticized because at small scale it could undermine efforts to drive a mass market shift in commodity production, while creating “clean” segregated supply chains with potential of leakage to other markets.

However, while traceability is challenging, it is not impossible. Global food safety and quality regulations already require a level of traceability. Also, as explored below, traceability and transparency tools and initiatives are being introduced in commodity supply chains to meet changing market demands, as highlighted in the introduction and below, within these constraints.

Traceability and transparency: Company-led actions and initiatives

Traceability and transparency approaches, as shown in the introduction, are not new but are evolving to incorporate characteristics beyond physical attributes to include data on legality, sustainability, or other criteria to meet changing market requirements (commitments and regulations). Where a commitment or market requirement exists, a solution is usually developed. Evidence for this claim is found in the evolution from paper-based to more advanced tracking systems instituted in many timber supply chains in the 1990s and the introduction of cattle traceability requirements to manage bovine disease outbreaks (see Appendix B). Other examples including high-end technical solutions are explored in “Innovation and direction of travel of technological applications for traceability and transparency.”

Table 9 highlights examples of traceability and transparency systems currently in use in global commodity supply chains and identifies the opportunities, limitations, and impacts of such tools. Key points from Table 9 are presented below.

  • Significant progress has been claimed by early movers on traceability and transparency:
    • Traders such as Golden Agri-Resources (GAR) have achieved 95 percent traceability to palm oil mill and to plantation (GAR 2022).
    • Leading brand owners have mapped their supply chains (e.g., Nestlé in partnership with Starling) (Nestlé 2018).
    • Leading meatpackers in Brazil have mapped and assessed the risks of forest loss of direct cattle suppliers (see Appendix A).
    • Traceability in timber supply chains has advanced a great deal and has been incorporated into supply chain management through voluntary approaches (e.g., certification), market access requirements (e.g., EU Timber Regulation), and national systems (e.g., in Brazil, Guatemala, or Peru) (Stäuble et al. 2022).
  • However, challenges remain, specifically in relation to traceability and transparency for indirect suppliers and smallholders in supply chains.

Table 9 | Examples of private sector–led traceability and transparency systems in commodity supply chains, based on company claims and not necessarily independently audited

Tool owner/user

Commodity

Function/aim of system/tool

Challenges/opportunities

Cargill’s SoyaWisea traceability portal

Soy

The portal provides customers with greater transparency about their individual soy purchases, certification details, information about sourcing areas, and an understanding of deforestation risk.

Customers can follow their soy shipments back to the region and the municipality of origin. This information makes it easier for customers to answer questions from their own customers and improves transparency.

Bunge’s Sustainable Partnership programt

Soy

Launched in 2021, the program works with direct suppliers to trace and monitor their own sourced volumes by adopting independent imaging services or using Bunge’s geospatial monitoring service at no cost.

The program is voluntary, though Bunge offers commercial benefits for resellers that make progress on traceability. Bunge carried out a pilot with one direct supplier and was able to incorporate the resulting data on indirect suppliers into its annual traceability reporting.

Nestlé partnership with Starlingr

Palm oil

The partnership monitors supply areas for deforestation risk.

Nestlé improves the transparency of its supply chain by publishing this approach, and headline results, on its website.

Through this partnership, Nestlé has been able to map 97% of its palm oil to mill (2021) and receive deforestation alerts in its supply areas.r,s

Nestlé does not itself own the mills or control where the mills are buying from, but this information informs its decisions on being involved in landscape projects.

Golden Agri-Resources (GAR)

Palm oil

GAR adopted its Forest Conservation Policy in 2011, with an ambition to trace all fresh fruit bunches purchased back to the plantation to ensure compliance with this policy.b

GAR has worked with a series of partners to develop its traceability and verification process, including GeoTraceability (for software development) and Koltiva, a supply chain technology and field solutions provider, to assist in a boots-on-the-ground approach to engaging with smallholder farmers.

In 2021, GAR reported that it had reached 95% traceability to plantation for its global supply chain, covering its own 49 managed mills (supplied by 536,000 hectares of plantations, including smallholder farms) and supply from more than 350 third-party mills.c GAR publishes a map of downstream facilities (refineries, kernel crushing plants, bulking stations) and GAR-owned mills in Indonesia. GAR uses these data to identify areas of support for independent smallholder suppliers, including providing oil palm seedlings, supporting efforts for oil palm replanting, offering training in good agronomy practices, and helping them prepare for certification.

Marfrig Verde+ Plan

Cattle

In mid-2020, Marfrig, with the support of IDH, developed the Marfrig Verde+ Plan using a range of in-house systems and third-party tools (e.g., Visipec)e to combine data from its own suppliers with those in publicly available datasets (e.g., on forest loss, farm boundaries) to trace and monitor indirect suppliers in line with zero-deforestation commitments.f

There are challenges in mapping indirect suppliers and assessing compliance with Marfrig standards.

Cargill CocoaWiseg

Cocoa

CocoaWise is Cargill’s cocoa-specific traceability and transparency project, aiming for 100% farm-to-factory traceability by 2030. It is a digital platform that connects the whole supply chain and provides customers with access to a personalized report covering the product origins, supply chain, and financial investments.

The datasets gathered improve first-mile traceability as they map the names and locations of Cargill’s cocoa sourcing network (farms, cooperative offices, and buying stations) and track the cocoa beans using bar codes to ensure that no beans from deforested areas enter its supply chain. Financial data are also collected to ensure that farmers are paid fairly.

According to a Cargill-specific case study, "Cargill has reached 100% farmer-to-factory traceability (direct suppliers) through its system in Ghana [where around 25,000 farmers had registered to a fully traceable bar code and digital payment system as of 2021] and 61% in Côte d'Ivoire [where over 70,000 farmers were included in a digital Cooperative Management System tracking about 120,000 tonnes of cocoa beans in 2021].”h,i,j

Global Coffee Platform, collective reportingk

Coffee

The Global Coffee Platform launched the collective reporting program through which members of the sector’s roasters and retailers report their annual sustainable coffee purchases using a standardized template, providing transparent insights on the expansion of a global market for sustainable coffee.l

The annual report collates data on the increasing proportion of sustainable coffee purchases, improving sector transparency by providing insights into origin and producing countries.m Although it demonstrates progress made among members choosing to report, scope for transformative change and complete transparency is limited without wider participation.

Agridence RubberTrace (previously HeveaConnect)n

Natural rubber

Agridence RubberTrace provides a digital marketplace for natural rubber that incorporates data-gathering and management tools to help trading companies understand their supply chains by mapping farms. Data on farm demographics, cultivation practices, and plot characteristics are collected to analyze land use change.o

A common issue with traceability in natural rubber is the high proportion of smallholders and the high number of intermediaries between production and manufacture. Agridence develops many tools and technologies to improve traceability throughout the supply chain (e.g., producing Internet of Things sensors in factories to automate data collection, or collaborating in research on ground truthing satellite imagery for rubber traceability)p and makes its marketplace compatible with these various data sources so users have access to useful information.

EcoVadisq

Various commodities covered by sustainable procurement ratings

EcoVadis is a private platform that companies pay to join. It provides assessments on the sustainability of various aspects of member companies, including sustainable supply chains of key agricultural commodities. These assessments are available for member companies to view on the platform, by allowing companies to share information downstream, or to view the assessments of their upstream partners.

This platform increases the transparency of whole supply chains for participating companies. By using standardized assessments, it also allows comparability and benchmarking. The systematic impact on supply chains is limited by the small proportion of the market participating and the fee-dependent access to information.

Note: IDH = the Sustainable Trade Initiative.

Sources: a. For more information, see Cargill’s SoyaWise page at https://www.cargill.com/sustainability/sustainable-soy/soyawise; b. GAR 2011; c. For more information, see GAR’s web page “Palm Supply Chain Traceability & Transformation” at https://www.goldenagri.com.sg/sustainability/responsible-sourcing/palm-supply-chain-traceability-and-transformation/; d. GAR 2021; e. For more information, see Visipec’s website at https://www.visipec.com/; f. For more information, see the page of the Verde+ program on Marfrig’s website at https://marfrig.com.br/en/sustainability/marfrig-verde-mais; g. For more information, see the web page for Cargill’s CocoaWise portal at https://www.cargill.com/sustainability/cocoa/cocoawise-portal; h. IDH et al. 2021b; i. For more information, see Cargill’s whitepaper on CocoaWise at https://www.cargill.com/doc/1432198008895/ccc-sustainable-cocoa-cocoawise-whitepaper.pdf; j. Cargill 2020; k. For more information, see the collective reporting page on the Global Coffee Platform website at https://www.globalcoffeeplatform.org/our-work/collective-reporting/; l. For more information, see the web page for the 2021 snapshot report for the Global Coffee Platform’s collective reporting: https://www.globalcoffeeplatform.org/latest/2022/snapshot-report-2021/#report-facts; m. GCP 2022; n. For more information, see the Agridence Rubber website at https://rubber.agridence.com/solution/; o. For more information, see web page “Agridence RubberTrace Farm Mapping Pilot and RubberWay Study” here: https://rubber.agridence.com/projects/agridence-rubbertrace-farm-mapping-pilot-and-rubberway-study/; p. For more information, see the Agridence Rubber website at https://rubber.agridence.com/solution/; q. For more information, see the EcoVadis website at https://ecovadis.com/; r. For more information, see Nestlé's page on responsibly sourced palm oil: https://www.nestle.com/sustainability/sustainable-sourcing/palm-oil; s. For more information, see Nestlé's page on its satellite monitoring with Starling and its palm oil transparency dashboard: https://www.nestle.com/sustainability/sustainable-sourcing/palm-oil/satellite-monitoring; t. Bunge 2021b.

Traceability and transparency: Indirect suppliers and smallholders

Where supply chains are vertically integrated, solutions for traceability and transparency are more straightforward and the influence on actors within the supply chain is greater. In contrast, traders or other major purchasers may source through a range of routes including producers they contract with directly (direct suppliers) and through third parties (e.g., other traders, agents or dealers, or cooperatives) that in turn have their own supply chains.

Indirect suppliers and third-party supply chains are one or many tiers removed from the trader or major purchaser, usually limiting influence on them. This challenge can be compounded when there are many smallholders in the supply chain.

These supply chain routes present challenges when implementing traceability and transparency systems, including posing risks associated with companies moving toward simpler supply chains by cutting out smallholders or intermediaries, or by setting up systems that create parallel data gathering structures that don’t enable smallholders to access and use the proprietary information that could support risk assessment and production & quality management processes instituted by cooperatives. Examples of how these challenges have been overcome through practical applications of traceability and transparency systems are explored here, along with lessons, opportunities, and challenges.

Indirect suppliers

Indirect suppliers exist in most commodity supply chains. The Accountability Framework initiative defines suppliers as either direct suppliers (selling directly to the buyer) or indirect suppliers (selling to an intermediary that is one or more steps removed from the buyer). More than 40 percent of key forest-risk commodities are sourced indirectly via intermediaries (zu Ermgassen et al. 2022).

Within the cattle sector in Brazil, for example, an individual animal may pass through several farms over its two-plus-year life cycle before reaching the direct supplier that sells cattle for slaughter to a meat packer. Each of those farms presents a potential risk for links to forest loss.

Major meatpackers Marfrig, JBS, and Minerva have initiated programs to address these challenges with similar commitments to trace and identify their indirect cattle suppliers. Several approaches to this traceability and transparency issue have been tried. A few examples are included here and explored in more detail in Appendix B:

  • Top-down approaches by each of the three major meatpackers utilizing a range of in-house systems and third-party tools (e.g., Visipec), combining information from their own direct suppliers and publicly available datasets (e.g., on forest loss, farm boundaries) to trace and verify indirect supplier linkages to legal or illegal forest loss. All companies have set 2030 targets to complete this task in Brazil, with targets for interim progress by 2025. While possible, progress remains slow. One of the reasons for this is because necessary data (such as animal transit data) remain siloed or are not shared across actors. In addition, direct suppliers have concerns about sharing data about their supplying farms.
  • Bottom-up approaches such as the Sustainable Production of Calves Program, launched in 2018 in part by Carrefour Brazil Group, which aims to improve small-scale producer inclusion and encourage these cattle farmers to verify legal compliance with laws governing forest loss and land conversion and use ear tagging. In some cases, this information was carried through to point of sale with information available to the consumer via a QR (quick-response) code printed on the product label. This was a successful program and is being scaled up as of 2022 with an aim to enroll a million calves across the Mato Grosso and Pará States, though this still represents only a portion of total heads of cattle in Brazil.
  • Collective cross-industry approaches with government support such as the terms of adjustment of conduct in the state of Pará, an agreement not to buy cattle from recently cleared land led by the Federal Prosecution Office. The agreement includes mechanisms to identify and verify compliance of indirect suppliers using existing cattle movement data not generally publicly available in other states. This will be explored more fully in this chapter.

Cooperatives, representing groups of soy farmers, may be concerned about disclosing their upstream suppliers for commercial reasons. They may also be hesitant to share information because they prefer to use their own systems for demonstrating deforestation- and conversion-free production instead of relying on systems from other providers. It could be argued that traceability and transparency are connected to the trading activities of these cooperatives and, therefore, any data generated within internal management systems are data that the cooperatives and their members own and should benefit from, leading to more benefits for all. Institutional support may be needed to share or cover start-up costs but “running” costs should be included in the cost of sustainable production and reflected in price. The challenge for the major trader is to ensure that the commodity it purchases can be verified as meeting its required standard while respecting these commercial confidences (see “Case study: Soft Commodities Forum” in Appendix E for one approach to working with intermediaries in the soy sector).

Within the timber sector, historically third-party traders have acted as intermediaries for hardwood imports into European and other timber markets with very little traceability or transparency of the origin of the timber (acting as “black boxes” within the supply chain). Regulatory controls introduced starting in the late 1990s requiring evidence of legality precipitated a shift away from these intermediaries toward more direct contact with timber suppliers, reducing spot market buying.

Smallholders/small-scale farmers and aggregation

The complexity of commodity supply chains, as described above, is higher where production is predominantly carried out by smallholders and small-scale farmers, as is typical of many of the commodity supply chains assessed in this report: palm oil, cocoa, rubber, and coffee. This is less true for soy, timber, and cattle, although the structure and composition of the sectors vary by country and small producers are important in some geographies.

Smallholders is a broad term but in the palm oil sector, for example, refers to farmers that own up to 50 ha of land, operating either independently or as part of a smallholder scheme or cooperative.24

Box 4 | Smallholder participation in commodity production

At a global level, more than 1.5 billion smallholders depend on forest and farm landscapes to produce food, fuel, timber, and non-wood forest products for their livings.a For different commodities, smallholders make up a significant portion of the supplier base:

  • More than seven million smallholders around the world make a living from oil palm.b In Malaysia and Indonesia alone, smallholdings represent approximately 40 percent of total palm oil production.c,d
  • Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana account for 82 percent of the global market share for cocoa with an estimated two million smallholder farmers.e
  • Six million smallholder farmers produce around 85 percent of the world’s natural rubber.f
  • Eighty percent of the coffee produced globally is produced by 25 million smallholders.g
  • Various associations have come out in support of market requirements despite the additional burdens placed on supply chains, highlighting opportunities for addressing smallholder-specific concerns about market access and exclusion.g

Sources: a. For more information see FAO’s page on micro, small, and medium-scale forest enterprises: https://www.fao.org/forestry/enterprises/99235/en/; b. For more information, see the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil’s page on gaining certification as a smallholder: https://rspo.org/as-a-smallholder/; c. Rahman 2020; d. Ichsan et al. 2021; Streck et al. 2020; e. GSPNR 2021; f. For more information, see Fairtrade’s page on coffee: https://www.fairtrade.org.uk/Farmers-and-Workers/Coffee/; g. A number of smallholder groups published a letter in February 2022 (available via the following link) to the commission highlighting their support while noting their needs: Lettre-aux-membres-du-conseil-et-du-parlement-europeen_Finale.pdf (ongidef.org).

Gaining access to information about smallholders and farmers is often the first step of data gathering required for traceability and transparency systems. However, this can present numerous challenges.

  • Accurate and real-time visibility over the whole supply base is not always possible using existing methods of traceability. Smallholders often sell to collectors or initial aggregators (in the case of palm oil, cocoa beans, coffee, rubber, some timber production), which then sell on to intermediaries and then to the first stage processor. Within the cocoa sector in West Africa, many smallholder farmers operate in cooperatives or sell to intermediaries, and it is often not possible to disaggregate the supply chains of cocoa smallholders to specific traders since in practice smallholders will supply to different traders at different times. Although the connections between cooperatives and traders may be known for each procurement cycle, many smallholders are not registered with a cooperative—60 percent of cocoa smallholders in Côte d'Ivoire are not registered with a cooperative, for example (IDH et al. 2021a). This makes it much harder for downstream actors to trace back to the site of production since cooperatives play a central role in coordinating engagement, sharing information, and gathering data. Where supply bases “overlap” in this way, collaborative action by buyers/processors is often advantageous and more effective, not just in helping to achieve traceability and transparency but also in pursuing other objectives related to livelihoods and productivity, among others (see example of the Cocoa & Forests Initiative in “Collaboration beyond individual supply chains”).
  • Smallholder mapping to enable traceability to plantation in palm oil is a static capture of what is actually a dynamic sourcing landscape. The traditional model of tracing supplies to the farm using field staff generates a snapshot of farms and farmer relationships at a particular moment in time. Data can become outdated due to land transfers, and because of the fluidity of selling and buying relationships among independent smallholders and agents or dealers, which are not wedded to selling to a specific mill.
  • Even if visibility is achieved, the data required may not be available. For example, not all smallholders have documentation for legal access, rights, and tenure of the land and commodity grown on it. This documentation is, however, often essential to establishing the legality of the operation and the commodity itself.
  • Access to technology may be limited. Not all smallholders have access to the internet, telecommunications, or technology to enable them to share information digitally. However, innovations in the use of mobile phone technology are advancing rapidly (as shown in “Innovation and direction of travel of technological applications for traceability and transparency”), which is helping to overcome these challenges.
  • Understanding of international or national policy requirements and standards may be limited or lacking, necessitating training support and capacity building.
  • Similarly, third-party certification to a commodity standard may be limited.
  • Due to the factors above, along with the associated cost of verification and compliance, smallholder producers are often not certified. For a downstream company this will mean that alternative evidence will be required, often using a combination of remote sensing and boots-on-the-ground data gathering.

To address these challenges, individual companies are taking steps to map smallholder farmers, engage with them, and develop practical traceability systems. Two such examples are the Cargill CocoaWise program and the smallholder engagement program that Musim Mas has been undertaking with smallholders in Indonesia (see Appendix C, Box 5, and Table 10).

Box 5 | Musim Mas’s traceability program

Musim Mas uses two approaches to gather data about independent smallholders.

Individual farmer mapping. The supplying farmer data are first gathered from agents, cooperatives, farmer groups, or local traders selling to Musim Mas mills; volumes are allocated to each farmer. Musim Mas’s “traceability and supplier engagement” team then goes into the field to verify submitted information and capture geocoordinates. Gathering and verifying data are both time and cost intensive and prone to inaccuracies and inconsistencies. It can take up to nine months to map the 6,000­–8,000 independent smallholders supplying an individual mill. Even after data have been verified, they can become inaccurate if land rights are sold.

A risk-based “supply shed” farmer verification approach. The farmer data are organized by villages and matched to a landscape map to look for village overlap with protected areas and peatlands. Those farmers are prioritized for field verification programs and ground truthing. The risk-based approach is estimated to be three times as fast and 13 times cheaper than mapping individual farmers.

Source: For more information, see Musim Mas’s web page on traceability and sustainability: https://www.musimmas.com/sustainability/traceability/.

These examples illustrate that

  • it is possible to achieve traceability and transparency to smallholder suppliers in complex supply chains, even if the process can be time consuming and resource intensive; and
  • there is likely to be overlap and duplication of efforts by companies where smallholders sell into shared supply chains.

Finally, governments can support company engagement with smallholders through mandatory national-level application of standards and mechanisms of assurance for commodity sectors in countries of origin (e.g., Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil, Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil) and in the case of timber through Timber Legality Assurance Systems, such as those developed through VPAs or in comparable government-owned information management systems for timber (see Appendix F).

Assurance systems can be helpful for companies where they are able to link commodity products within their supply chains to these systems in the country of production, enabling them to verify origin and compliance to an independently audited national standard and thereby meet changing market requirements where applicable.

Indirect suppliers and smallholders: Challenges and priorities for action

Companies have been able to work through complexities in their supply chains to increase traceability. For palm oil, traceability to mill and managed plantations and to third-party plantations has become routine. Traceability to smallholder plantation or to farm is possible but can be very time and resource intensive. For companies sourcing from many thousands of smallholders, farm-level traceability is in part a logistical issue, but also creates other challenges, including the following:

  • Direct suppliers may be wary of disclosing the identities of their own suppliers for commercial reasons (e.g., reducing their own competitiveness) and because of the perceived risk that they may be excluded from the market if they cannot meet the required standards. These concerns are being addressed by companies with programs to support farmers to achieve full compliance. For example, within the Marfrig Verde+ Plan, Marfrig promotes an approach to supplier inclusion by providing technical and financial assistance.
  • Direct suppliers may not have full visibility themselves of the full life cycle of the commodities they are purchasing (e.g., cattle) and may face similar disclosure concerns from their own suppliers.
  • Companies with significant but not majority market share can have limited influence over a domestic market. This can complicate the implementation of traceability and transparency systems if there is a large domestic market with less stringent requirements.
  • Governments can play several important enabling roles:
    • Mandating national-level application of standards and mechanisms of assurance for commodity sectors in countries of origin (e.g., Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil, Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil, and Timber Legality Assurance Systems)
    • Making information available to support traceability and transparency, as in these examples:
      • Timber Legality Assurance Systems were developed to improve forest resource management as part of the VPAs but also in some countries as a way to access markets, including carbon markets
      • The state of Pará has linked public data on animal movements with data for assessing forest loss with Selo Verde
      • Governments have supported collaborative action across a sector (e.g., in cocoa supply chains through the Cocoa & Forests Initiative)
    • Requiring mandatory due diligence in importing markets to drive demand for greater traceability and transparency
  • While government roles are important as listed above, there are also limitations to government approaches, including the required coordination among agencies, which can cost time; lack of funding to provide sufficient staff to efforts; and divergent definitions, which can limit the ambition of government-led standard setting
  • An aligned and collective approach to traceability and transparency across sectors is very important (see “Collaboration beyond individual supply chains”) to agree on standards, definitions, and protocols for verification

Verification and providing assurance of credible evidence

Accessing and making data available for use is a core component of any traceability and transparency system. However, the usability of data is contingent on quality, including ensuring the data are credible and trustworthy to a level accepted by market or stakeholder requirements.

Verification to provide assurance of credible evidence is predominantly done on three levels:

  1. Own verification by individual companies of their own systems and data
  2. Third-party verification, often relying on voluntary certification standards
  3. Government-level assurance through national (mandatory) certification and in some cases information collected through conventional government oversight (e.g., pre- and post-harvest inspections in forestry, where enabling conditions are in place to collect credible data from oversight activities)

Comparability and consistency in both definitions and what constitutes credible evidence is important. The Accountability Framework initiative (AFi)25 has sought to achieve consensus across civil society (with industry support) on definitions (e.g., for deforestation) and on expectations for monitoring and reporting. In September 2022, AFi released new guidance on aligning corporate targets, accounting, and disclosure in partnership with the Science Based Targets initiative and the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (AFi 2022).

  • Alignment on definitions and reporting has been essential for providing a level playing field for companies that publicly report, giving confidence that they report progress in a similar way, and for customers and other stakeholders that use this information. Alignment has also reduced the burden for companies by simplifying the reporting process, requiring less staff time and resources. Persistent differences in approaches to reporting, however, continue to limit comparability and transparency, particularly where reporting initiatives remain voluntary, as discussed further in “The role of public reporting and disclosure.”

Own verification and assurance systems

Many companies have developed their own verification systems. These systems are often developed when there are supply chain complexities and/or when voluntary or mandatory certification standards are either not available, not applicable, or too expensive. In some cases, companies work together to develop and implement such verification systems, aligning where possible on the approach, definitions and standards, and evidence. Table 10 presents examples of such approaches, and associated challenges and opportunities.

Table 10 | Examples of company own verification and assurance systems

Commodity

Example(s)

Challenges and limitations

Opportunities for further development

Soy

Cargill maps its direct suppliers’ farm boundaries using polygon mapping and draws on satellite data from external sources to monitor and identify land conversion connected to soy cultivation. It markets soy that has verified production practices as “Triple STM”—Sustainably Sourced and Supplied.a

Mapping indirect suppliers is a challenge, shared by other major soy traders within the Soft Commodities Forum (e.g., ADM and Bunge).b

  • Mapping completed for 100% of direct suppliers in Brazil; work underway to complete this task in other South American countriesa

Palm oil

No Deforestation, No Peat, and No

Exploitation (NDPE) policies with the Implementation Reporting Framework (IRF).

The IRF is a voluntary self-reporting tool looking at social and environmental issues related to NDPE commitments. It provides a common approach to understanding and monitoring progress of uncertified mills toward fully meeting NDPE requirements.c

The NDPE IRF is developed by a working group of the Palm Oil Collaboration Group, which involves over 30 large companies from across the palm oil value chain.c

The framework is self-reporting and is not currently independently audited or verified, so there may be some lack of uniformity in disclosures.

There is no common chain-of-custody system post export, so IRF-based claims may struggle to see wider market acceptance beyond place of production.

  • Mechanisms for recognizing progress toward full certification/segregation
  • Recognition of national systems (e.g., Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil, Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil)
  • Extend use across industry

Cattle

JBS,d Minerva,e and Marfrigf have internal systems for mapping and monitoring both direct and indirect suppliers (see Table 9 for more information on Marfrig’s Verde+ Plan and Appendix A for information on JBS and Minerva)

Many company systems rely on the self-reporting of upstream suppliers—different approaches are used by different meatpackers, which can make comparative assessment of progress across the sector difficult.

  • Further alignment among meatpackers on verification criteria and standards

Timber

Timber companies use a range of tracking systems, which may be paper based, mixed with bar codes and in some cases radio-frequency identification tags, all depending on the supply chain and available technology.

These systems are often used for domestic markets.

  • Designed to provide assurance to market, but also for internal planning purposes

Cocoa

Tony’s Chocolonely used technology from ChainPoint to develop Beantracker, its traceability software.g

The Beantracker system generates and hosts data about the flow and trade of cocoa beans. It does not incorporate data on sustainability characteristics at the point of production. Instead, Tony’s must identify cooperatives to work with through other means, then Beantracker ensures that beans from those cooperatives end up with Tony’s.

  • Managed to trace 100% of the cocoa beans it uses back to the level of the cooperativeg
  • Working to build partnerships with and support new cooperatives that it starts sourcing fromh
  • Model could be adopted by more of the industry

Coffee

In 2004, Starbucks launched C.A.F.E. Practices—Coffee and Farmer Equity Practicesi—in collaboration with Conservation International. This was one of the first sets of ethical sourcing standards for the coffee industry, working not only toward environmental sustainability, but also ensuring that the company protects the well-being of coffee farmers and their communities.

The system works by awarding points for compliance with the standard’s criteria. Those that score below 60% have to go through the time and cost of reverification every year, potentially putting smallholders at a disadvantage to larger cooperatives, despite their representing around 80% of global coffee production.

It is also limited to Starbucks’ direct sourcing, rather than the sector as a whole.

  • Practices establish social, environmental, and economic criteria guidelines, achieving 99% ethically sourced coffee in 2015j
  • As well as sustainable agricultural practices, criteria include economic transparency throughout the supply chain
  • A verification system rather than a one-off certification, it requires continuous improvement

Natural rubber

ITOCHU’s “Project Tree” initiativek works to increase traceability in the network of smallholders and intermediaries supplying two rubber processing plants in Sumatra, and helps farmers improve their livelihoods and practices. Rubber that is verified as sustainable can be segregated and traded separately.

The project involves an incentive scheme to encourage engagement with the system and runs in parallel with a sustainability scheme supporting farmers.l However, the platform is currently unable to track the activities of farmers, nor is it able to pay those without bank accounts, so incentives reserved for farmers are currently pooled or used in the broader sustainability support scheme.

  • Project could establish a secure, up-to-date database of transactions among actors in the area, including smallholders and intermediaries, and guide mechanisms for providing financial incentives and support

Sources: a. Cargill 2022; b. WBCSD 2022b; c. For more information, see the web page of the NDPE IRF: https://www.ndpe-irf.net/; d. For more information, see JBS’s Responsible Raw Material Procurement Policy on its JBS360 sustainability website: https://jbs360.com.br/en/responsible-procurement/; e. For more information, see Minerva’s 2021 sustainability report: https://www.minervafoods.com/rs-2021/index_EN.html; f. For more information, see Marfrig’s web page on the Marfrig Verde+ program: https://marfrig.com.br/en/sustainability/marfrig-verde-mais; g. For more information, see Tony’s Chocolonely’s statement page on traceability and its Beantracker: https://tonyschocolonely.com/nl/en/our-mission/serious-statements/tonys-beantracker; h. Tony’s Chocolonely 2020; i. Starbucks 2020; j. For more information, see the page on C.A.F.E. Practices at its website Starbucks Coffee at Home: https://www.starbucksathome.com/gb/story/café-practices; k. For more information, see the website of Project TREE: https://project-tree-natural-rubber.com/; l. For more information, see the “Initiative” page on the website of Project TREE: https://project-tree-natural-rubber.com/initiative/.

Own company verification and assurance: Lessons for traceability and transparency

  • These approaches are self-verified by design, which can raise questions about the credibility of assurance they provide. This is important for downstream customers but also governments, financial investors, and civil society in holding companies to account.
  • Comparison between commitments and performance remains difficult based on individual company reports where the definitions, scopes, and methods of verification vary. This variation can undermine confidence in individual companies but also entire sectors and lead to decisions to exclude markets. For example, in 2021 several European retailers decided to cease purchasing Brazilian beef (Keating 2021).
  • The UK Soy Transparency Coalition26 aims to address this lack of comparable market data on company performance by gathering more detailed information directly from traders on their policy compliance, but this is voluntary and available on a payment basis to members only.
  • The Implementation Reporting Framework (IRF)27 for palm oil uses self-reporting. The IRF is often disclosed on company dashboards. Differences in the approaches taken by companies mean that it is not always feasible to collate and use the data provided. Work is underway to strengthen the processes used for monitoring and disclosing information.

Voluntary certification standards

Voluntary third-party certification standards have evolved over the past 25 years to provide market assurance on commodity supply chains, where credibility was seen as lacking. For example, in the 1990s when there was increasing concern about timber production leading to mass deforestation, a broad set of groups created the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).

Some certification standards, such as the FSC, provide balanced representation across industry, environment, and social concerns. Most standards have common features such as governance bodies, grievance mechanisms, and reporting requirements to provide market assurance.

Certification standards have been developed for most of the commodities that are the subject of this report, with standards in development for rubber through the Global Platform for Sustainable Natural Rubber.28 The market uptake of these standards varies considerably with higher proportions of certified palm—19 percent of total global production of crude palm oil was certified to the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) standard in 2021 (RSPO 2022b) and a lower proportion of certification in the soy sector (1.25 percent of total soybean production globally) was certified against the Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS) standard in 2021.29 Between 27 percent and 47 percent of cocoa production in 2019 complied with a voluntary sustainability standard (e.g., Fairtrade, UTZ, Rainforest Alliance) (Bermudez et al. 2022a).

Table G-1 in Appendix G provides a summary of the main certification standards along with the percentage of production that they account for where this information is available.

There are requirements related to the control of certified products along the supply chain, including flows of certified and noncertified products and associated claims. Table G-2 summarizes these models.

A common starting point for companies purchasing certified product is to purchase credits or certificate transactions. These provide evidence that the product has been audited and verified against the standard at the farm level but do not provide a traceable connection to the physical product purchased downstream.

Different levels of traceability of physical flows of certified product are provided by mass balance, segregated, and identity preserved (IP) chain-of-custody models (see Table 11). Only in a segregated or IP system is certified product physically segregated from noncertified material. Within a mass balance chain-of-custody model, certified product is monitored to ensure that only the amount that has been produced is sold, but in the supply chain it is mixed with noncertified material. In practice, this means it is not possible for a purchaser of mass balance certified product to know what proportion of the physical material they are buying is certified.

There are advantages and disadvantages to the different chain-of-custody models for traceability and transparency. Segregated products provide greater traceability within supply chains, but establishing this separation can add cost. Credits and mass balance models offer downstream companies (e.g., retailers, brand owners) a practical mechanism through which they can support more sustainable commodity production and, for example, give smallholders access to benefits, but do not provide assurance on traceability connecting this certified material to their supply chains.

Markets will likely increasingly demand greater levels of traceability both in response to emerging legislative requirements (e.g., the requirement for geolocation within the forthcoming EU Deforestation Regulation30) and market demands (e.g., requirements for traceability of physical soy flows by companies within the UK Soy Manifesto).31

Certification bodies are responding to these developments. For example, RSPO is developing proposals for improving the robustness of the mass balance chain-of-custody model, which could include the noncertified proportion meeting a minimum standard of legality and deforestation- and conversion-free (SPOC 2022; RSPO 2022a). RTRS is retrofitting its chain-of-custody standard to accommodate due diligence requirements (EC 2023).

Table 11 | Chain-of-custody models for sourcing commodities

Chain-of-custody model

Description

Establishes physical traceability to land management unit(s)?

Identity preserved

Chain-of-custody model in which the materials or products originate from a single source and their specified characteristics are maintained throughout the supply chain

Yes, to unique land management units (LMUs) for identity preserved materials

Segregation

Chain-of-custody model in which specified characteristics of a material or product are maintained from the initial input to the final output

Yes, to multiple LMUs for segregated materials

Controlled blending

Chain-of-custody model in which materials or products with a set of specified characteristics are mixed according to certain criteria with materials or products without that set of characteristics, resulting in a known proportion of the specified characteristics in the final output

Yes, to multiple LMUs for the known share of materials

Mass balance

Chain-of-custody model in which materials or products with a set of specified characteristics are mixed according to defined criteria with materials or products without that set of characteristics

No, does not ensure physical traceability to specific land management units

Source: Greenhouse Gas Protocol, “Land Sector and Removals Guidance,” Draft for Pilot Testing and Review, 2022, https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/Land-Sector-and-Removals-Guidance-Pilot-Testing-and-Review-Draft-Part-2.pdf, Chapter 16, Table 16.11.

Voluntary certification: Lessons for traceability and transparency

  • Certification can help meet market demands for assurance that commodities have been produced to meet specific standards, including legal production and deforestation-free.
  • Not all certification standards provide the same level of assurance of traceability to origin. This is increasingly requested by markets and emerging due diligence regulations, which owners of certification standards are beginning to respond to.
  • Overall, uptake in global commodity supply chains remains limited both in terms of hectares and volume certified and market demand.
  • The cost premiums of certification and how these costs should be shared across the supply chain (shared responsibility), including with farmers (to support living incomes), are active (but unresolved) discussion points for actors within commodity supply chains.

National and regional standards

National-level assurance or certification processes have evolved in recent years in response to the need to comply with national laws such as the FLEGT and related licensing32 and through VPAs between the EU and a number of timber-producing countries (EC 2013).

For example, in 2016, Indonesia started issuing FLEGT licenses, automatically meeting the requirements of the EU Timber Regulation.33 The EU Timber Regulation prohibits operators in the EU from placing illegally harvested timber and products derived from illegal timber on the EU market and mandates due diligence. Indonesia’s FLEGT licensing scheme is based on a mandatory certification system called the Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu (Republik Indonesia 2018), a TLAS, which was developed by the government of Indonesia with input from stakeholders as a result of the VPA between Indonesia and the EU.

A number of other timber-producing countries are in the process of developing a TLAS under a VPA with the EU to verify the legality of their timber, and therefore also its traceability. In addition, other countries are pursuing traceability and transparency systems for the forest sector for other reasons including enhancing natural resource management, formalizing economic sectors, and improving tax collection, among others (Stäuble et al. 2022).

Box 6 | What is a Timber Legality Assurance System?

A TLAS is a national system designed to verify and demonstrate that timber and forest products conform to national laws.

According to a recent report on the TLAS assessment framework study (undertaken as part of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Targeting Natural Resource Corruption project), a complete and robust TLAS tends to have the following six elements:

  1. A legality definition that identifies the subset of national laws that will be assessed for compliance
  2. Tools and mechanisms to ensure transparency and stakeholder involvement
  3. Supply chain control and verification mechanisms whose goal is to ensure and demonstrate the legality of the timber
  4. Government oversight providing monitoring on a system level
  5. Enforcement actions by government if and when laws are broken
  6. A policy response mechanism that uses information on the functioning and impact of the TLAS to inform executive and legislative processes

A TLAS may also produce a legality statement intended to serve as proof to international buyers and other parties that products are legal.

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Report on the TLAS Assessment Framework Study, Targeting Natural Resource Corruption Project, October 2022 (unpublished).

Within the palm oil sector, the Indonesian government has developed a national mandatory standard for palm oil, Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). Approximately 32 percent of oil palm plantations in Indonesia achieved ISPO certification in 2020. Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) is similarly a mandatory national standard for the Malaysian palm oil sector. Over 97 percent of oil palm planted area in Malaysia had achieved MSPO certification in 2022. Both are certification standards similar to those described above but do not currently provide chain-of-custody assurance for palm oil meeting these standards once exported.

National standards, certification, or reporting schemes such as those described in the timber and palm oil sectors (see Appendices F and C, respectively) can play an important role for domestic and export markets for these commodities:

  • They can raise the bar for sustainable production standards at a national level, providing impact at scale. This is important given the size of the domestic markets for these commodities: For example, almost three-quarters of beef produced in Brazil in 2020 was consumed domestically. In 2021, 37 percent of Indonesia’s palm oil production was consumed domestically. They can also ensure that all exports of commodities meet a given standard regardless of the end market requirements (ISTA Mielke GmbH 2022).34
  • As indicated in “Own verification and assurance systems,” national standards could be helpful for companies if they are able to link products within their supply chains to assurance systems such as these in the country of production, enabling them to verify origin and compliance to an independently audited standard. This could reduce the need to extend traceability and transparency systems to thousands of individual smallholders.
  • National systems could play an important role in supporting voluntary certification standards by, for example, providing a level of assurance on the noncertified products entering into a certified system, as is the practice for mass balance certification.

The development and implementation of national standards can also present challenges such as the following:

  • Developing these standards can take time, as does reaching national-level consensus if a standard is developed in a multistakeholder process, such as a TLAS.
  • Systems need to ensure that smallholders retain market access and are not excluded by costs.
  • Building international market recognition and acceptance is an important enabling condition.
  • The chain of custody needs to extend beyond point of export, to link to and pass assurances into international commodity supply chains.
  • Market share is limited for all voluntary approaches, and mandatory national standards are mainly limited to country of production although FLEGT licenses have achieved some market acceptance in procurement and existing import regulations.

Lessons

  • Traceability and transparency are challenging in complex and multi-tiered global commodity supply chains. Purchasing commodities through a variety of routes, including direct and indirect suppliers, and mixing sources within supply chains at mills, at silos, at points of export, and during transportation create additional issues.
  • Challenges for data sharing also include those related to commercial sensitivities (in opening supply bases), data confidentiality (where data exist within public systems but cannot be shared), and technology (linking databases, transitioning from paper-based to electronic systems).
  • However, verification of data on commodity characteristics at origin is possible through company systems, third-party voluntary certification schemes, and collective approaches at a jurisdictional or landscape level. Voluntary certification has provided one mechanism for downstream companies to support sustainable commodity production and gain some assurance on traceability, but uptake remains limited.
  • Companies increasingly self-report on progress against commitments, but comparability remains difficult because of a lack of consistency and alignment in approaches to monitoring, verification, and reporting. Self-reporting is considered less robust than independent verification. This undermines the role transparency can play as a lever for change (see “The role of public reporting and disclosure”).
  • Market and regulatory pressures have been increasing for greater traceability and transparency to provide assurance on legality and risk of forest loss. Increasingly, companies have been looking at ways to work together to achieve this assurance through mass market “pre-competitive” solutions. These are discussed more fully in “Collaboration beyond individual supply chains.”

Enabling conditions and interdependencies

  • The costs of the transition to sustainable commodity production need to be absorbed and equitably shared through the supply chain. The cost burden for farmers to reach a living income, achieve sustainable production, and meet the requirements of traceability systems (e.g., mapping supply chains) throughout the supply chain should be shared to ensure that they can meet these goals.
  • Data sharing needs to be encouraged and facilitated to reduce duplication of efforts and costs, and enhance transparency. This could be achieved through greater alignment and interoperability of datasets, indicators, and definitions, supported by continued, transparent dialogue focused on solutions.
  • Data shared and disclosed must be credible, verified, and audited by third parties. While third-party assurance alone does not guarantee credibility, external assurance bolsters trust in the validity of reported data and verification of deforestation-free claims, which is essential to building and maintaining credibility.
  • Companies further downstream need to be able to interpret publicly available data on the performance of their suppliers, often many tiers removed, to set and monitor their own policies on deforestation.
  • Governments can set up mandatory national standards and mechanisms of assurance for commodity sectors in countries of origin. These systems exist for timber and palm oil, and may play an increasing role in international and national markets. They can help link smallholders to international supply chains.
  • Governments can make information available to support greater traceability and transparency to meet domestic regulatory and market requirements (e.g., compliance with national policies, assurance mechanisms) and regulate mandatory due diligence within major importing markets, both of which seek to drive demand for greater traceability and transparency. However, these market requirements need to be inclusive and designed with the needs of smallholders in mind to avoid market exclusion (Fairtrade 2022).
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