working paper

Just transitions in the oil and gas sector

Considerations for addressing impacts on workers and communities in middle-income countries

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Revenue Loss and Implications for National Economies

Phasing down global oil and gas production, in line with either IEA’s NZE Scenario or Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS), could lead to significant revenue loss for oil- and gas-producing middle-income countries.20 A recent analysis, comparing the business-as-usual scenario assuming a $60/barrel long-term oil price with IEA’s SDS, which assumes a long-term oil price of $40/barrel, estimated an average 46 percent decline in revenues (approximately $9 trillion) between 2021 and 2040 for 40 “petrostate” countries with the greatest fiscal dependence on oil and gas revenues (as a share of total government revenues) if oil prices fall to $40/barrel (Coffin et al. 2021).21

The loss in revenues will not be felt equally by all countries. For instance, over the next two decades Mexico’s average annual revenues are expected to drop by 84 percent and Nigeria’s by 69 percent, compared to their 2015–19 revenues (Coffin et al. 2021).

Figure 3 plots countries’ dependence on oil and gas revenues against their estimated revenue decline in a scenario of $40/barrel prices to illustrate each country’s risk. Some 400 million people live in the 19 most vulnerable countries (Tiers 4 and 5), which include Nigeria, with a population of 206 million (Coffin et al. 2021). Emerging producers with plans to expand oil and gas production, such as Ghana, Guyana, and Mozambique, risk both the loss of potential revenue if expected new income does not materialize and stranded assets from investment in infrastructure to bring these fossil fuel resources online (Coffin et al. 2021; Dwazu et al. 2021; Muchira 2021).

Figure 3 | Vulnerability of Oil- and Gas-Producing Countries to Declining Oil Prices

Notes: SDS = Sustainable Development Scenario; UAE = United Arab Emirates. The estimated decline in oil and gas revenues is based on fossil fuel demand under the International Energy Agency’s SDS (2021–40), which assumes a long-term oil price of $40 per barrel. Myanmar, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Yemen are not included due to lack of data. Coffin et al. (2021) organize countries according to tiers, with Tier 1 being least vulnerable and Tier 5 being most vulnerable. Vulnerability is determined by the potential total government revenue shortfall between 2021 and 2040. The more vulnerable a country is, the higher risk it would endure during a transition.

Source: Adapted from Coffin et al. 2021.

As the energy transition picks up and demand for oil and gas goes down, the impact of declining oil and gas revenues will be felt widely within oil- and gas-producing middle-income countries.

Decreased Spending on Social Programs and Public Infrastructure

The boom-and-bust nature of the oil and gas industry makes producer economies that rely on this revenue especially vulnerable to shortfalls in public spending budgets. Reduced revenues from the oil and gas sector could depress public spending on social services and infrastructure projects, such as transport and digital connectivity, with the impact likely disproportionally borne by disadvantaged groups and at the local level (UNU-INRA 2019). Most middle-income countries are already spending too little on social protection programs to provide necessary services to local communities, and current spending often fails to benefit the poorest in society or reduce inequality (ILO 2011; Lawson and Martin 2019).22

The 2014 oil price crash led Mexico to slash public spending (amounting to about 0.7 percent of GDP), including on education (Wilkinson 2015). The same crash led Angola and Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil-producing countries, to roll back plans for key infrastructure spending, including a $5 billion electricity access program and road construction plans in Angola (Greve 2015). In 2020, Nigeria proposed 55 percent and 42 percent cuts in education and health spending, respectively, due to dwindling oil sales and the latest crash in global oil prices (Adeyeye 2020). Nigeria already underfunds its health and education sectors—4 percent and 6 percent of the 2020 federal budget was allocated to health and education, in comparison with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s recommended spending of 15 percent and 20 percent, respectively—and further cuts could worsen the country’s health and education outcomes (Bakare and Fatai 2020). Countries with high levels of debt also have to balance debt repayment with much-needed spending on their residents (Jubilee Debt Campaign et al. 2020).

Decreased SNG Revenue

Loss of revenue could spill over to SNGs, affecting their ability to deliver services and pursue economic development. In many middle-income oil- and gas-producing countries, SNGs receive most of their funds as transfers from national governments (Table 2).23 As a result, these governments are subject to the ebbs and flows of national government revenue allocations.

Countries that derive significant revenues from nonrenewable natural resources such as oil and gas have developed special formulas to distribute those revenues to SNGs (Bauer et al. 2016). In derivation-based systems, revenues are transferred back to their area of origin, with the aim of compensating producing regions for the environmental and social impacts of resource extraction. This is a common form of revenue sharing, including in Angola, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, and Uganda. In indicator-based systems, revenues are geographically distributed based on indicators such as population, poverty, or total revenue generation, and the focus is on greater equalization among different regions of the country (Bauer et al. 2016; NRGI 2015b). In some cases—for instance, in Ecuador, Mexico, Nigeria, and Uganda—revenue transfers are based on a combination of these approaches. In Nigeria, before the 2021 passage of the Petroleum Industry Act, 54 percent of revenues were distributed to state and local governments (Table 2). Of that, 41 percent of revenue transfers were indicator-based, where the central government transferred revenues to both producing and nonproducing regions. The remaining 13 percent were sent to regions from which the income was generated.

Table 2 | Distribution of Oil and Gas Revenues in Selected Countries (2014)

 

Bolivia

(oil and gas)

Brazil

(oil and gas)

Colombia

(oil)

Ecuador

(oil)

Indonesia

(oil)

Mexico

(oil)

Nigeria

(oil)

Papua New Guinea

(oil and gas)

Revenue to national government and centralized funds

37%

31%

52%

98%

85%

83%

46%

93%

Revenue to subnational governments

Derivation-based

Producing region/state

28%

45%

10%

1%

3%

-

13%

3%

Producing localities

13%

17%

1%

6%

-

-

2%

Localities in producing regions

-

4%

-

-

6%

-

-

-

Indicator-based

Region/state

9%

-

38%

-

-

17%

23%

-

Localities

13%

-

-

-

-

18%

-

Revenue to others (for instance, private landlords)

-

3%

-

-

-

-

-

2%

Note: In derivation-based systems, revenues are transferred back to a subnational entity in the location where the resource was extracted. In indicator-based systems, revenues from these resources are geographically distributed to subnational entities based on indicators such as population, poverty, or total revenue generation.

Source: Adapted from Arellano-Yanguas and Mejía-Acosta 2014.

The manner in which oil and gas revenues are shared with SNGs impacts how SNGs experience the volatility, benefits, and downsides of the industry, with implications for the political economy of the transition away from oil and gas.

Derivation-based systems, in particular, can create equity, volatility, and public financial management challenges that SNGs are ill-equipped to handle. For instance, prior to the passage of Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Act, more federal spending was allocated to Nigeria’s oil-producing regions in the South than to nonproducing regions in the North, even though the North scores lower on most human development indicators than the South (Box 2).24 Boom times incentivize wasteful spending on projects, and busts lead to painful spending cuts at the subnational level. In Brazil, large oil royalties to municipalities led to overspending on wasteful urban infrastructure projects while there was deterioration in public service provision, including decreased access to piped water, sewage networks, and garbage collection (Bauer and Gankhuyag 2020). Finally, the derivation-based system can encourage greater resource exploitation, especially when resource-hosting regions are poor and oil and gas revenues account for a large share of subnational revenues (Bauer and Gankhuyag 2020).

Box 2 | Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Act Promotes Oil Exploration in the Country’s North

Nigeria’s 2021 Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) changes both oil revenue allocations as well as the regulatory and governance frameworks of the country’s oil and gas sector. It also intends to attract further investment in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry and reduce conflict in oil-producing regions.a

Thirty percent of oil revenues collected by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and 10 percent of rents on petroleum prospecting licenses and petroleum mining leases will be apportioned to the Frontier Exploration Fund, a new entity to pursue state-backed oil and gas exploration in Nigeria’s northern inland basins.b

Nigeria’s North lags behind the South on almost all economic and human development indicators, leading to concerns that the new law, with its emphasis on more oil exploration, may worsen the North’s already precarious socioeconomic situation. These concerns are based on the experience of the relatively richer oil-producing Niger Delta in the South, which, despite being the center of oil resources, remains marginalized, poor, polluted, and has seen political instability with the emergence of armed groups since 2004.c Instead of potentially replicating these problems in the North, Nigeria could transfer resources from the oil sector to invest in other industries that can promote more sustainable growth and help diversify Nigeria’s economy. Civil society and research organizations propose alternative uses for the 30 percent allocation to the Frontier Exploration Fund, including support for energy transition plans, economic diversification, renewable energy, environmental remediation in oil-producing regions, and social programs.d

Three percent of an oil and gas operator’s annual expenditures will fund host community development trusts (HCDT), mandated by the PIA to be incorporated by operating companies for community development in areas of oil and gas exploitation.e Seventy-five percent of the HCDT funds will be allocated to infrastructure projects, 20 percent to a reserve fund for when oil and gas operations end, and 5 percent to administrative costs.f However, companies will determine who meets the PIA’s definition of a host community, and the community will be held collectively responsible if oil and gas production is disrupted or infrastructure is damaged, with the cost of repairs subtracted from their HCTF allocation.g There has been pushback against the new law. Host communities advocated for higher HCTF allocations,h Nigeria’s 36 state governors claimed the law was unconstitutional,i and Nigerian environmental groups criticized the PIA’s exemptions and low penalties for gas flaring.j

Sources: a. Nwuke 2021; b. Tayo 2021; c. McBain 2022; Tayo 2021; d. Egbejule 2021; HOMEf 2021; Nwuke 2021; Pers. Comm. Felix 2021; personal communication between the authors and an engineering consultant in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, August 6, 2021; e. Federal Republic of Nigeria 2021; Deloitte n.d; f. PwC 2021a; g. Nwuke 2021; h. Erunke 2021; HOMEf 2021; McBain 2022; i. Ebolosue et al. 2021; j. HOMEf 2021.

How local economies in a derivation-based system deal with a long-term decline in revenues could become a central challenge, especially in planning for a managed transition away from oil and gas. The challenge will be exacerbated if SNGs do not have access to the full details of oil and gas revenues collected and transferred to SNGs. Currently very few national governments share the details of their revenue-sharing system, making it difficult for SNGs to budget and plan for the future and undermining trust between the national government and SNGs (Bauer 2013; Bauer and Gankhuyag 2020). Most SNGs also have less information available to them about prospects for a country’s oil and gas reserves or prospective revenue flows they might receive based on project-by-project projections. This will leave them poorly equipped to handle the fiscal and economic consequences of phasing down oil and gas production.

Public Sector Job Loss

In many middle-income countries, the government employs a large share of the formal sector workforce. Argentina’s and Mexico’s public sectors employ roughly 17 percent and 12 percent of the formal workforce, respectively (OECD 2020). In Nigeria, more than half of salaried/wage jobs are in the public sector (World Bank 2015). Furthermore, across most of Africa, the share of government spending devoted to government employee compensation is 30–50 percent, compared with 5–15 percent in Europe (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser 2016). Declining oil and gas revenues could jeopardize the sustainability of public sector employment, especially in scenarios where the domestic workforce is relatively young and set to expand in the coming years (IMF 2016).

In the recent past, the double blow of the pandemic and the oil price shocks spurred cuts to public sector wages in some oil-exporting middle-income countries (Cornish and al-Omar 2020). In 2020, Nigeria’s Kaduna state government implemented 25 percent and 50 percent pay cuts for public servants and political appointees, respectively (NAN 2020). The Nigerian federal government also initiated efforts, including a payroll review of public sector employees aimed at reducing personnel costs in response to dwindling revenues (Ajimotokan 2021).

Large employment or wage cuts of such a sizable share of the workforce would have widespread impacts on livelihoods. Public sector workers in middle-income countries, in general, receive higher wages and larger benefits than their private sector peers, which means the loss of well-paying jobs in the event of job cuts (Gindling et al. 2020). Cuts in public sector employment or wages carry implications for economic opportunities for women and other marginalized groups. The public sector is not only a large employer of women but generally pays a wage premium for them, as well as for less educated and lower-skilled workers, compared to the private sector.

Finally, the potential loss of income when the public sector lays off workers could affect the rest of the economy. This includes adverse impacts on the informal economy because wage workers represent a significant source of demand for goods and services sold by the informal sector. Informal sector employment is a main income source for 60 percent of African households (Fox and Signé 2020).

Impacts on Fossil Fuel Subsidies

Periodic market volatility and longer-term decline in oil and gas production might force governments to abruptly and inequitably cut expenditures on fossil fuel subsidies in ways that harm the most vulnerable and lowest income groups in society.

To be clear, fossil fuel subsidies—both production- and consumption based—are a drain on national budgets and undermine efforts to address climate change by increasing the use of fossil fuels (Urpelainen and George 2021). In many places, such as Ghana and Indonesia, they have been regressive and inefficient, with subsidies distorting the market and benefiting wealthier portions of society more than the poor they are supposed to help (Arze del Granado et al. 2010; Crawford 2012). Fossil fuel subsidies also limit public spending in other sectors, including health, education, and poverty alleviation programs. Mexico’s proposed 2022 budget suggested spending as much as 4.8 percent of the country’s GDP to support Pemex and the state-owned utility, the Federal Electricity Commission—more than the 3.5 percent proposed for education (Prud’homme 2021).

Although these subsidies hamper the shift to clean energy and need to be phased out to meet mounting climate ambition, how it is done will matter.25 Their overly abrupt and inequitable removal could disproportionately burden low-income households and exacerbate inequality and social unrest if not carefully managed. This happened in Ecuador in October 2019 after the government announced a phaseout of gasoline and diesel subsidies. Following widespread protests, the government reintroduced the subsidies (Sanchez et al. 2020).

Fossil fuel subsidies are often influenced by the price of oil (Figure 4), and these fluctuations can be disruptive. In 2020, a number of countries, including Nigeria and Venezuela, cut back fuel subsidies and raised taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel because the pandemic had reduced both consumption and the price of oil (Krauss 2020). That year, fossil fuel consumption subsidies dropped to a record low of $180 billion, down by 40 percent compared to 2019 (IEA n.d.a). Rapid declines in subsidies can disproportionately harm those with lower incomes given that the subsidy removed will be a larger proportion of their income (Coady et al. 2015).

On the other hand, events such as the war in Ukraine will likely prompt governments to raise subsidies to shield consumers from high fuel costs (Browning and Kelly 2022). This can result in decreased government revenue available to spend on other public purposes. Nigeria, for example, increased spending on gasoline consumption subsidies in 2022 to offset high global oil prices driven by the Ukraine war. The increased spending—from $5.0 million in January 2022 to $7.8 million in May 2022—meant the NNPC failed to make any deposits into Nigeria’s Federation Account, which allocates revenue to Nigeria’s federal, state, and local governments for spending (Nnodim 2022). There is also a risk of countries increasing production-based subsidies to diversify supply away from Russia. Over the long term, however, as oil and gas revenues shrink, governments may not have much option but to phase down or eliminate fossil fuel subsidies.

Figure 4 | Fluctuation in Fossil Fuel Subsidies Influenced by Price of Oil

Notes: bbl = barrel of crude oil. The above graph shows government spending on fossil fuel (including coal, electricity, natural gas, and petroleum) subsidies for 52 countries, including 18 Group of Twenty members and 42 emerging economies. Data on fossil fuel subsidies are from OECD and IEA (2021). Data on price of oil are from Statista (Sonnichsen 2022a) and shows average annual Brent crude oil price.

Sources: OECD and IEA 2021; Sonnichsen 2022a.

A well-managed and careful phaseout of fossil fuel subsidies can benefit oil- and gas-producing middle-income countries by freeing up funds to provide necessary social services and strengthen social safety nets, invest in local economic development and diversification, and support the policies, programs, and infrastructure necessary to enable a just transition away from oil and gas (Gass and Echeverria 2017).

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